Showing posts with label Hungary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hungary. Show all posts

Thursday, July 31, 2014

Will Transcarpathia Be the Next Donetsk—or Crimea?


Even as the actual territory controlled by the pro-Russian puppet states of the People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Lugansk in eastern Ukraine shrinks under pressure from the advancing national Ukrainian military, the fictive super-state of which these rebel provinces are a part is sounding cocky and thinking of expanding.

Pro-Kremlin separatists call the light-blue-colored oblasts in this map a federated Novorossiya.
Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) is at the far west.
The foreign ministry of the Union of People’s Republics of Novorossiya (that term meaning “New Russia”) (formerly the Federal State of Novorossiya)—the federation that includes the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (provinces) as well as six other Ukrainian oblasts where rebel republics exist only in name or not at all—agreed in a meeting in Yalta, Crimea, on July 6th and 7th, to accept as a member the so-called Republic of Podkarpatskaya Rus’.  A new pro-Russian organization called the People’s Front for the Liberation of Ukraine, Novorossiya, and Transcarpathian Rus’ released a manifesto at that conference.

Pyotr Getsko (left), “Chairman of Government Minister” (sic) of the Podkarpatskaya Rus’
“republic,” with Vladimir Rogov, chairman of the foreign-affairs committee
in the Novorossiya “parliament.”  At left is the current Transcarpathia oblast flag, also used by
separatists and nationalists, while the flag on the right is that of the Donetsk People’s Republic,
though the center blue stripe is so washed out that I first mistook it for the black, white, and red
tricolor of the former German Reich (and, briefly, the Third one).  Thanks to a reader who pointed
this out to me on the “Flags of the World (FOTW)” Facebook group.
Transcarpathian Rus’ the Ukrainian government calls Zakarpattia oblast, in its far west.  Rus’ refers to Kievan Rus’, the Medieval state based in Kyiv (Kiev, for Russians) which both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists (and Ruthenian ones; see below) regard as their ancestral state.  The Carpathia part refers to the mountain range that separates the province from the rest of Ukraine to the east.  Variously known as Podkarpatskaya, Subcarpathia, or Transcarpathia, the territory’s Pod- (meaning below) and Sub- prefixes refer to the territory’s position on the Carpathians’ foothills (as in the name of the adjacent voivodeship (province) of Poland, Podkarpacie), while Trans- refers to its position “across” or “on the other side of” the Carpathians—a point of view that implies (as with Transnistria) the perspective of Moscow or Kyiv, rather than Vienna or Budapest.  And indeed, Transcarpathia used to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the Kingdom of Hungary’s administration.  Slavic-speaking locals called Ruthenians, Ruthenes, or Rusyns tried to establish their own state when the Hapsburg empire was being dismantled at the end of the First World War, but had to settle for becoming the eastern tail of the new-born oblong composite state of Czechoslovakia.  When the Czech portion of Czechoslovakia succumbed to annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938, Slovakia and Ruthenia declared independence but were soon consumed by the Third Reich as well.  After the Second World War, the Yalta conference (not the one referred to above, but the other one, the big one) awarded Transcarpathia, as it was then known, to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.  Josef Stalin proceeded to stamp out Ruthenian cultural identity, declaring Rusyn a mere dialect of Ukrainian.  Ruthenians demanded an autonomous region like Crimea’s when Ukraine became independent in 1991 but did not get one.  A declaration of independence in 1993 as the Republic of Subcarpathian Rus’ got nowhere, nor did a similar declaration in 2008 as the Republic of Carpathian Ruthenia.  That second one was strongly suspected by the westward-leaning Ukrainian government of the time to be a result of Kremlin pot-stirring; this, of course, was around the time of Russia’s expansionist South Ossetia War in Georgia.

How today’s Ukraine was divvied up before the First World War.
Transcarpathia has not been a particular hotbed of anti-Kyiv feeling, not does it have particularly many ethnic Russians, compared to all the other oblasts Novorossiya claims.  But this blog did suggest the tiny  province, as long ago as early March, as a future point of conflict between pro-Kyiv and pro-Moscow forces, a point I reiterated in another article, in early April.  (See also an article in which I report on Russian analysts’ predictions for an independent Transcarpathia by 2035.)  In particular, two factors make this enclave an inviting morsel for omnivorous Novorossiyan map-drawers, and indirectly perhaps for the Kremlin itself.  The two factors are demographics and geography.

A Transcarpathian flag (current oblast flag) at this year’s Novorossiya summit in Yalta.
First, demography.  Transcarpathia is more than 80% ethnically Ukrainian and less than 3% ethnically Russian, with Rusyns (Ruthenians) making up less than 1%—only about 10,000 people.  But this belies a possibly larger number of families of Rusyn descent who assimilated to Ukrainian and Russian culture and language in the Stalin era and may only now be dusting off their old ethnic identities.  Russia may be intending to use supposed oppression of Rusyns as a pretext for intervention, much as it did to “protect” Abkhaz and Ossete “victims” in Georgia in 2008 and ethnic-Russians in Crimea earlier this year.  (Compare also the Russian-speaking political forces in Latvia which have piggybacked their cause onto the question of autonomy for the traditional Latgalian people who live in the ethnic-Russian-dominated areas of Latvia.)

Are Transcarpathian Ruthenians ready for their ethnic revitalization?
Or does Moscow just wish they were?
More to the point, 12% of Transcarpathia’s 1.25 million or so people are ethnic Magyars (Hungarians), making them the largest non-Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine in any single oblast.  (Ukraine has more ethnic Belarussians and Moldovans (Romanians) than Magyars when taken as a whole nationally—but these other groups are more dispersed (though 20% of the less populous and smaller Chernivtsy oblast nearby call themselves Moldovan or Romanian).)  Concern for the Transcarpathian Magyars’ “plight” has become an obsession of Jobbik, the militant far-right party of xenophobes and anti-Semites that took more than a fifth of the vote in Hungary’s elections this April, making it the second most powerful party in that country.  Jobbik bloviators have been pushing Budapest to annex Transcarpathia if necessary to “protect” ethnic kindred there.  A lot of the rhetoric focuses on the Ukrainian government’s revocation of minority languages’ official status after Ukraine’s pro-Moscow president, Viktor Yanukovych, was impeached in April.  Even though the successor government quickly reinstated those rights, the original revocation is still Exhibit A of those, like the Donetsk and Lugansk rebels, who claim the current Ukrainian government oppresses minorities.  The fact that the armband-wearing, goose-stepping thugs of Jobbik and the southeastern “people’s republics” are working from the same playbook helps put the lie to Moscow’s lunatic assertion that it is the “junta” in Kyiv who are the right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis.

The far-right group Jobbik is the second-largest political party in Hungary.
Now to the geographic factor, which concerns central and western Europe’s dependence on Russia’s natural gas (hence the European Union’s toothless and half-hearted sanctions against Russia since the Ukrainian troubles began).  Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, would like to keep the gas flowing to Europe, but he would also like to be able to cut off the supply to Ukraine if necessary to bring it into line.  The trouble is the oil pipelines to western Europe for the most part run straight through Ukraine, and most of these go through tiny Transcarpathia in particular.  And Transcarpathia’s border with the Slovak Republic—an E.U. member-state friendly to Kyiv—is one of the few places where the pipelines could be used to send gas back into Ukraine as a way of making an end run around any plans by Putin to choke off Ukraine’s supply.


Could Putin or the Russian-speaking thugs in Ukraine make an actual grab for Transcarpathia?  Not likely.  They weren’t even able to turn independence declarations into “facts on the ground” in two other oblasts—Kharkiv and Odessa—where the demographics tilt toward Russians.  (The so-called Odessa Republic of Novorossiya declared with little effect in late April granted diplomatic recognition not only to the Kharkov, Lugansk, and Donetsk people’s republics but, a little mysteriously, to what its “foreign ministry” called the Carpathian Ruthenian People’s Republicas reported at the time in this blog.)  Those areas are firmly under Kyiv’s administration.  But many observers feel that Putin may not really want to annex any other chunks of Ukraine, that he would be happy to destabilize it and weaken its central government through agitation for federalism.  And an invasion and annexation of Transcarpathia is not entirely impossible either.  After all, a mere year ago anyone who predicting a Russian invasion of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk would have been laughed out of the room.  Ukraine’s war with Russia has not yet been won.  Not by a long shot.

The scene in Donetsk.  Could conflict spread to Transcarpathia as well?




[You can read more about these and many other separatist and new-nation movements, both famous and obscure, in my new book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas just published by Litwin Books under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  The book, which contains 46 maps and 554 flags (or, more accurately, 554 flag images), is available for order now on Amazon.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even if you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this interview for more information on the book.]


Thursday, March 6, 2014

Second Crimean War Update: Western Credibility, Russian Lies, and Putin’s Next Steps (Hint: “Donetsk Republic”)

Disarmed Ukrainian troops in Crimea just before a tense but inconclusive showdown
yesterday with Russian troops disguised as “local defense forces”
The Second Crimean War is well under way.  And if there was ever an illustration of the principle that history always repeats itself, the first time as tragedy and the second time as farce, it is the events of the past couple weeks.  The first Crimean War gave us the tragic angelic figure of Florence Nightingale, ministering to the wounded, and the fighting was immortalized by Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s “Charge of the Light Brigade.”  The Second Crimean War gives us Vladimir Putin—that second-rate, bargain-bin Czar—in an odious little soccer-fan haircut arrogantly spouting lies, while the Kremlin’s English-language media mouthpiece, Russia Today, brings no less a foreign-affairs expert than pinheaded action-film star and former child-trafficking suspect Steven Seagal on camera to badmouth Barack Obama and the European Union (E.U.) and praise Russia, in between jarring mucosal noises emanating from his nose and throat.  Is that the same Steven Seagal who has a lucrative sponsorship deal with a Russian munitions firm?  Yup.  Is this simpleton also the same Steven Seagal who was considering running for governor of Arizona?  Um, well, um, not anymore, I guess.  I suppose that exploratory committee might just quietly disband now.

Pro-Kremlin media roll out the red carpet for foreign-policy expert Steven Seagal.
On the ground, meanwhile, what used to be the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within the Republic of Ukraine is now de facto under the control of the Kremlin.  Russian troops occupy its major government buildings and surround its airports, a pro-Russian regional government has seized control, and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet blockades the peninsula’s harbors.  Putin, in a press conference the other day, flatly denied that there were any Russian troops in Crimea beyond those already there in leased naval bases and that it was ad hoc “local self-defense forces” that were controlling the peninsula.  That is contradicted by the fact that these forces are using Russian military vehicles as transport, that they use the latest and most sophisticated weapons and training techniques, that reporters have recorded troop movements from Russia into Crimea, and that members of these supposed local self-defense forces have flat out told reporters that they are members of the Russian military taking their orders from Moscow.

Putin at his press conference this week
Meanwhile, Putin claims that his support for and solidarity with these self-defense forces is in response to a threat to the very existence of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking minority—who are a majority in Crimea—from fascists and neo-Nazis that have forcibly taken over the Ukrainian government and ejected its legitimate president, Viktor Yanukovych.  There are indeed ultranationalists in Ukraine, and some of them are dismayingly infatuated with the symbols and themes of the German-aligned rebel forces that fought the Soviet Union on the devastated battleground that Ukraine became during the Second World War.  It is also true that some of these ultranationalists, through their very loudness and insistence, seem to have won some sort of seat at the table in the new Ukrainian government.  But the new government in Kiev was appointed by the duly elected Ukrainian parliament, including a president and prime minister succeeding the opulently corrupt Yanukovych after he had already fled the country and been duly impeached by parliament.  As for Ukrainian oppression of ethnic Russians?  International media and observers have looked for and found no evidence whatsoever that this is going on.  The new Ukrainian government did indeed reverse some previous controversial language laws that had privileged the Russian language (an unwise move, public-relations-wise), but if anything ethnic Russians now seem to have the run of eastern Ukraine’s major cities (more on that below).  Putin’s pretexts for war are utterly concocted, but the general public in Russia and in eastern Ukraine have no other sources of information than the Russian-language media that the autocratic Putin has been systematically taking control of over the past decade.

John Kerry patiently explains to an ordinary Ukrainian citizen
precisely which flimsy pretexts for war are acceptable in the 21st century.
The United States secretary of state, John Kerry, has visited Kiev and has made a strong case against Russian aggression, but he has also stumbled over some credibility issues.  Kerry asserted, in words that have now become famous, “You just don’t invade another country on phony pretext in order to assert your interests.”  Wait, is this the same John Kerry who, as senator for Massachusetts, voted to authorize the use of military force in Iraq, in a war based on what everyone, including Senator Kerry, utterly and completely knew were lies and false pretexts concocted by George W. Bush?  Yes, that is the same John Kerry (you see, he wanted to be president someday, and he didn’t want anyone to have a reason to call him unpatriotic).  And, call me prescient, but when he was first appointed secretary of state—and when Hillary Rodham Clinton, who voted the same way in 2003, was appointed secretary of state before him—I foresaw that some day a situation just like this might arise.  Even though Obama, to his credit, opposed the Iraq War from the getgo, nonetheless Russia and the pro-Russian media have pounced on Kerry’s rank hypocrisy with well-deserved glee.


As insanely fictive as Putin’s version of events is—and Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, got off the phone with him this week and declared him to be “living in another world” and not “in touch with reality”—there is a perverse logic to the Kremlin’s case, and it is designed to underline and showcase the West’s hypocrisy.  After all, the arguments that Putin is making—that Russian military maneuvers and policies are merely to defend a threatened ethnic minority—are exactly those arguments that were used in 1999 to justify the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s unilateral and non-U.N.-sanctioned violation of the Republic of Serbia’s sovereignty in a bombing campaign that targeted Serbia’s civilian infrastructure in violation of the Geneva Conventions.  (Kerry supported that, too, by the way.)  Yes, indeed, the Serbian persecution of Kosovo’s Albanians was real, while the Ukrainian persecution of Crimea’s Russians is not.  But Putin is 100% right that the West is hypocritically denying to Russia the unilateral leeway to use illegal military force that it claims for itself.  The carving out of the Republic of Kosovo from the soft southern flank of Serbia, a Russian ally, has been a thorn in Russia’s side for a very long time.  You can call the Second Crimean War Putin’s payback.  If anything, Putin has really been enjoying himself pointing these parallels out.


So much for the ideological battle, the war of words.  This is not where the battle will be won; it will be won on the ground, on the vast plains of the Steppes which have once again, for the first time in seven decades, become a gruesome chessboard for the strategists in Moscow, London, Paris, and Washington.  What will happen to Crimea now, and what is Putin planning next?

For the time being, Crimea has been lost.  The Ukrainian military is not contesting this in any concrete way.  What had been a March 30th referendum on independence promised by Crimea’s new Russian-installed government has now become, within the past 24 hours, the promise of a March 16th referendum (no sense wasting time, I suppose) on whether Crimea should become part of Russia.  Putin has stated that he doesn’t want to annex Crimea or even separate it from Ukraine ... yet.  But a referendum result would authorize him to change his mind and move in troops to defend “the people’s choice.”

Anti-Russian demonstrators with Crimean Tatar national flags in Simferopol this week
A full-on annexation by Russia would be problematic; for one thing, it would trigger all sorts of United Nations measures involving violations of sovereignty.  More likely, Putin will blush and say “aw shucks” at the compliment but then politely tell Crimea’s Russians that they should just be independent instead.  This would create another Russian puppet state, like Transnistria in Moldova or South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia—run by Kremlin stooges and defended by Russian troops while enjoying no international legitimacy.  One could also add to this list of pseudo-states the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which post-Soviet Armenia, a Russian ally, created as a puppet state out of an Armenian-populated part of Azerbaijan.  This would go a long way toward Putin’s desired recreation of the old Soviet empire from the rubble of the Soviet successor states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia as Russian vassal states and South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and now Crimea as de facto Russian-ruled pockets scattered around within otherwise hostile countries.  (Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are all strongly Western-aligned.)

The flag of Abkhazia, a Russian puppet state, on display with the Russian one
This much is already clear.  Similar propaganda campaigns and manufactured provocations preceded the establishment of those other puppet states.  It is now Putin’s standard playbook.  Incidentally, it is also chillingly similar to the way that Adolf Hitler used the pretext of supposed persecution of ethnic Germans stranded in foreign countries that used to be imperial possessions in order to justify the annexation of Poland and the Sudetenland, the creation of puppet states in Hungary and Croatia, etc. etc.


That Putin will succeed in bringing Crimea into his orbit no one doubts.  All anyone is talking about now are what costs he will be made to pay and how much further he is willing to go.  As for the costs, one thing Western strategists need to realize is that Putin might not even care.  Lots of talking heads and columnists are telling us that a stable, prosperous Ukraine economically engaged with both West and East is in everyone’s interest, including Russia’s, and including especially Russia’s oligarchs who pull so many strings, and thus Putin will eventually realize this and not spark a wider war.  But is this point of view a mistake?  If Merkel’s intuitions are correct, Putin is not rational.  Did Hitler care that he was driving the German economy into the dirt to expand his empire as widely as possible?  No, and his supporters didn’t care either.  Both 1940s Germany and 2010s Russia can be characterized as shot through with a pathological form of aggrieved nationalism: the belief that all of their current problems are because a decadent West has emasculated them and and dismantled their empires and are vindictively holding them back from the former imperial Golden Age greatness that is their due.  Like Hitler, Putin may be willing to put his own country through any hardships and humiliations to follow the Holy Grail of regained imperial glory.  He wants there to be statues of himself in every square in Russia after he dies.  He also knows that he has nuclear weapons and that no one wants to take him on directly.  (It’s worth pointing out here that the U.S. and NATO, in foreign adventures like Kosovo, Afghanista, Libya, and Iraq, act with this kind of impunity as well.)

Donbas (i.e., Donetsk region) irredentists rally in eastern Ukraine
But how far will he go?  The big question is whether he will try to pull a Crimea-type stunt in predominantly-Russian parts of the eastern and southern parts of the Ukrainian mainland as well.  Indications are that he is testing those waters.  On March 3rd, pro-Russian mobs stormed government offices in Donetsk, a city in the ethnic-Russian-dominated east of Ukraine which is capital of the eponymous home oblast of Yanukovych himself, who is of Russian, Belarussian, and Polish ancestry, not Ukrainian.  Donetsk oblast (see map below) is about 75% Russian-speaking and is named for the Don River—that’s Don as in And Quiet Flows the Don, the novel by the Nobel-Prize-winning Russian writer Mikhail Sholokhov, which glorifies the Don Cossacks—who had their own republic during the Russian Civil War, in territory that includes modern Ukraine.


The leader of the regional-level mini-coup in Donetsk, which seem well coordinated, is one Pavel Gubarev, head of the People’s Militia of Donbas, who held a raucous press conference in Donetsk oblast’s main government building yesterday (March 5) in front of the black, red, and blue flag of what he called the Donetsk Republic.  To a crowd chanting, “Rossiya! Rossiya!” he thundered, “I am for Donetsk being a part of Russia!”  He promised that on March 8th “there will be a ‘People’s Committee’ meeting here.   Only then can we make the decision regarding Russian troops. Kiev are involved in their own affairs and their deputies here are too frightened to do anything. It's time for us to take the decisions here.  There is no chance that people here in Donetsk will want to continue being part of Ukraine.  The people of Donetsk support us.  We shall address the Russian authorities and ask them to bring a peacekeeping force here.  It is the only way to keep order.”

Gubarev plans to invite Russian troops to annex the “Donetsk Republic.”
Information on the background of the 30-year-old Gubarev, who brandishes a bandaged right hand, is hard to come by.  But most of the crowds in the Donetsk uprising, such as it is, seem to be either bussed in from Russia itself or are being given Russian passports en masse.

The mysterious Pavel Gubarev ...

... who bears an uncomfortable resemblance to General Zod from the planet Krypton
The tricolor used by the so-called Donetsk Republic appears to be that of the Donetsk–Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic, one of several briefly-existing Bolshevik states that existed in the midst of the Russian Civil War in 1918 before power was consolidated in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as we later knew it, under the U.S.S.R.’s umbrella.  Donetsk–Krivoy Rog had its capital at Kharkov (now called Kharkiv; see map above), which was also proposed last month by pro-Russian activists in Crimea as the capital of a future Federated States of Malorossiya (Malorussia, i.e. “Little Russia,” a Czarist name for Ukraine).

The hastily concocted coat-of-arms of the Donetsk Republic
It sort of tells you all you want to know about the sort of people promoting a Donetsk Republic that they choose that drab tricolor over the existing oblast flag, which is one of the loveliest flags to be found anywhere:


Other such republics that might see revival in the next days or weeks included one centered on Odessa, a currently ethnic-Russian-dominated oblast abutting Moldova, Romania, and Transnistria which also has a significant Jewish population.  The city of Odessa also has a Black Sea port Putin wouldn’t mind getting his hands on.  A puppet-state in Odessa would also link Transnistria (see above) territorially with the Russian heartland and might, thus, permanently prevent Moldova from ever joining NATO or reunifying with Romania.

Hastily produced Donetsk Republic passports
Perhaps as potentially as volatile as Donetsk but far more ethnically complex is the far-western oblast of Transcarpathia (Zakarpats’ka). Here, the Slavic ethnic group known as Ruthenians (a.k.a. Rusyns) were denied an independent homeland in the Paris Conference that divvied up the Balkans after the First World War.  As a consolation prize, they were splooged together with Bohemian, Moravian, Silesian, and Slovak nationalities as the eastern tail end of the newly invented composite nation-state of Czechoslovakia.  But after the Second World War, Transcarpathian Ruthenia was rewarded for defying Hitler by being forcibly integrated into the Ukrainian S.S.R.  In 1991, as Communism collapsed, Transcarpathia asked for, but was not given, its own autonomous region in the way that Crimea eventually was.  A 2008 declaration of Transcarpathian independence was considered by the Ukrainian government to be engineered by Moscow—this out of fear that Russia would do to Ukraine with Transcarpathia what it did that same year to Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  But by this time Carpathian nationalism couldn’t possibly have much to do with Ruthenians themselves.  There are now only 10,000 or so Ruthenians out of over a million Transcarpathia oblast residents, less than 1%.  Russians are only 3%, but ethnic Magyars (Hungarians) are 12%.

The current flag of Transcarpathia
Transcarpathia’s Hungarians also seemed to want autonomy in the 1990s and 2000s, and they seem to be behind a stirring of discontent there now.  The Hungarian language was also marginalized along with Russian in post-Yanukovych Ukraine’s language reforms (referred to above).  This is causing the Transcarpathian Magyars to be suspicious that the new regime is not in their interests, and their predicament, such as it is, has also attracted the notice of far-right elements in Hungary itself. Hungary’s foreign minister, János Martonyi, visited Transcarpathia on March 1st to plead for cross-border unity between Magyars and denounce Kiev’s new language policy.  Martonyi also raised the question of the (highly nationalistic) Magyar minority in Romania’s Transylvania region as well.

The far-right Jobbik party makes up over a tenth of Hungary’s parliament,
and they are taking a keen interest in developments just over the border in Ukraine.
On the other hand, a less conciliatory tone was taken by Hungary’s radical, far-right, neo-fascist opposition party Jobbik, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom).  Jobbik’s second-ranking party leader, Márton Gyöngyösisaid on March 3rd that Hungarians and Ruthenians in Transcarpathia should have their language rights restored, should be exempt from the military draft, and should be given “full territorial autonomy.”  Jobbik is perhaps best known to western media because its former leader, Csanád Szegedi, a member of the European Parliament who like his fellow party members was unrepentantly anti-Semitic, was revealed in 2012 (as reported at the time in this blog) to be Jewish himself.  (He resigned and later embraced his ancestral Orthodox Jewish faith.)  Jobbik, which controls 11% of the seats in Hungary’s legislature, regards the current, post-Yanukovych regime in Kiev as illegitimate—which is ironic, because that puts them on the same page as Putin and Russia, who are busily demonizing the Ukrainian political mainstream as infiltrated by exactly the sort of neo-Nazis that Jobbik actually are.

Csanád Szegedi traded his armband in
for a yarmulke.
Things in Transcarpathia could get messy very quickly.  But Ukraine as a whole may well be headed for collapse, engineered from without.

A member of the Ukrainian feminist political collective Femen
arrested today outside the Crimean parliament building in Simferopol
[You can read more about these and many other separatist and new-nation movements, both famous and obscure, in my new book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas just published by Litwin Books under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  The book, which contains 46 maps and 554 flags (or, more accurately, 554 flag images), is available for order now on Amazon.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even if you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this interview for more information on the book.]



Saturday, November 24, 2012

Fatmir Limaj to Face War-Crimes Charges (Again); Fiji Recognizes Kosovo; Vojvodina Leader Arrested: Kosovo & Serbia Update, 18-24 November 2012

Fatmir Limaj will now have to face war-crimes charges.

Kosovo Politician Arrested on Corruption Now to Face Retrial on War Crimes.  The supreme court of the partially recognized Republic of Kosovo ordered on November 20th that a former cabinet minister who was arrested last week by NATO police on corruption charges be retried on charges of war crimes, including the murder and torture of Serbian prisoners during the war for independence from Serbia.  The minister, Fatmir Limaj, Kosovo’s former minister of transport and communications and currently a parliamentarian and the deputy chairman of the republic’s ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (P.D.K.), was a member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (K.L.A.) during the 1998-99 Kosovo War.  Limaj was originally tried in May on the same charges but was acquitted after the former prison guard, Agim Zogaj, who was chief witness against him was found hanging dead from a tree in a park in Germany.  His written testimony was deemed inadmissible, but this week’s ruling reverses that and brings Limaj back to court.  Three other former K.L.A. rebels will be retried with Limaj.

Fiji Becomes 95th Country to Grant Kosovo Diplomatic Recognition.  The Republic of Fiji has become the 95th country to grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Kosovo, according to a November 20th announcement by the office of Kosovo’s prime minister, Hashim Thaçi.  This follows closely on the heels of recognition by Timor-Leste (reported on last week in this blog), Burundi, and Papua New Guinea (as reported earlier in this blog).  Now Kosovo is only three short of 98, which would make it recognized by a majority of the world’s 193 generally-recognized sovereign states.  The Republic of Serbia still claims Kosovo as its territory.
Grenade Explodes at Kosovar Administrator’s Home in Serb-Ruled North Kosovo.  Another grenade blast rocked the Serbian-administered sliver of the Republic of Kosovo called North Kosovo on November 19th, according to police.  The grenade went off in the town of Zvečan (spelled Zveçan in Albanian), the residence of Dušan Milisavljević, deputy chief of the Republic of Kosovo’s administrative office for the town.  Zvečan is a Serb-dominated town which is administered through the Republic of Serbia, though officially it is under Kosovar sovereignty.  Police were investigating.  The following day, incidents of stone-throwing between Serb and ethnic-Albanian construction workers in Kosovsko Mitrovica, North Kosovo’s de facto capital, led to gunfire, but no injuries were reported.  At issue in that incident was the controversy over construction of new homes for ethnic Albanians in North Kosovo.  Eight Serb police in North Kosovo were suspended in the wake of that incident.


Serbia’s Ex–Deputy Premier, a Vojvodina Nationalist, Nabbed on Corruption Charges.  A former deputy prime minister and nationalist politician who represents the Republic of Serbia’s ethnic Hungarians was arrested on November 20th on corruption charges.  The politician, József Kasza (that’s is Hungarian name; Serbs call him Jožef Kasa), used to head the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians and was part of the democratic reforms that swept the Serbian nationalist war criminal Slobodan Milošević out of power in 2000.  The province of Vojvodina is home to Serbia’s Hungarians and was part of the Hungarian-aligned Banat Republic after the First World War and, under the name Danube Banovina, an expanded Axis-aligned Hungary during the Second World War.  Kasza is accused of intentionally issuing bad loans while managing a state-run bank.  Critics point out that the Serbian government’s aggressive anti-corruption campaigns, which are part of its attempts to qualify for membership in the European Union (E.U.) seem to focus exclusively on opposition parties.

József Kasza
[Also, for those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with a forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  Look for it in spring 2013.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.]

Saturday, September 8, 2012

Lopota Gorge Questions, Azeri Axe-Murderer Pardoned, New N.K.R. Pres, Cossacks on Patrol: Caucasus Update, 2-8 September 2012

A Georgian military checkpoint in the Lopota Gorge
TOP STORY:
QUESTIONS PERSIST OVER LAST WEEK’S MILITANT SIEGE
IN GEORGIA’S LOPOTA GORGE, NEAR DAGESTAN BORDER;
2 GEORGIANS, PLUS A BODYGUARD OF AKHMED ZAKAYEV’S, AMONG THE DEAD

Details continued to be sorted out in the murky militant siege last week (reported on in detail in this blog) in the Republic of Georgia’s Lopota Gorge, near the border with Dagestan.  Despite protestations to the contrary by the Georgian minister of the interior, Shota Khizanishivili, who spoke out this week to squelch rumors that Georgian citizens were among the 11 dead militants, a couple days later, identities of some of the 11 militants killed in the operation were being released.  Two—Aslan Margoshvili and Bakhaudin Kavtarashvili—were indeed Georgian citizens.  Another, Dukvakha Dushuyev, was a 44-year-old former bodyguard of the Chechen separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev.  Some witnesses have suggested that all of the dead may be Georgian.  From his exile in London, Zakayev vowed to get to the bottom of the incident.  A fourth was identified with a birthplace of Grozny, Chechnya, and three others were identified as from Chechnya and Ingushetia, which, like Dagestan, are Russian republics in the North Caucasus.  Pankisi Gorge, where the Georgian militants were from, is in Georgian territory—and was the site of an outbreak of violence in 2003—but home mainly to 5,000 Kists, who are a branch of the Chechen ethnic group, as well as to recent Chechen war refugees.  The original online rumors asserted that the Georgians were Wahhabis on their way to Syria to fight against Bashar al-Assad’s Shiite Alawite regime in the civil war there.  Wahhabis follow an extremist strain of Sunni Islam and dominate the Caucasus Emirate movement operating in Dagestan, in southwestern Russia.

NORTH CAUCASUS

Cossacks Patrolling Krasnodar to Defend Olympics Make 100 Arrests on First Day.  In southwestern Russia, the first of the promised Kuban Cossack detachments which are to protect Krasnodar Krai from Muslim ne’er-do-wells from the North Caucasus during the 2014 Olympics in Sochi were deployed September 1st in Krasnodar city, and they made more than 100 arrests on their first day.  The approximately 1,000 Cossacks are to aid police and defend the Olympic city against “non-Russians,” though they carry no firearms, only whips.  When the plan was announced last month by Krasnodar’s governor, Aleksandr Tkachev—who told a police gathering, “What you can’t do, the Cossacks can” (as reported at the time in this blog)—his overt racism and unilateral militarism drew fire from human-rights groups and even Russian Federation officials (also reported here).  And now there is talk of Cossacks performing police patrols in 18 other regions in Russia, including Moscow.  Krasnodar is a predominantly ethnically-Russian jurisdiction in an area where Muslim, Turkic-speaking Circassians were ethnically cleansed by successive czarist and Communist regimes over the past 150 years, and it is a focus of the Islamist separatist Caucasus Emirate movement.  It is also the site of an independent, Menshevik-allied Kuban People’s Republic, which existed for less than two years before being absorbed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) by Vladimir Lenin’s Red Army in 1920.

There’s never a Cossack around when you need one.
War of Words Continues in Chechen-Ingush Border Dispute.  The president of the Republic of Ingushetia in southwestern Russia’s North Caucasus region, Yunus-Bek Yevkurovaccused the president of the neighboring Chechen RepublicRamzan Kadyrov, of provocation for calling Ingushetia’s Sunzha district and part of Malgobek district “indigenous Chechen territories.”  The two republics were joined together as the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the Communist era, and their shared border in the new Russian Federation has never been fully demarcated.

3 Rebels, 6 Police Dead across South Caucasus in Muslim Insurgency.  Security forces in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, in southwestern Russia’s North Caucasus region, on September 1st killed an insurgent who they claim was planning a major terrorist attack.  The man opened fire at a police checkpoint where he was being stopped for a vehicle inspection.  Bomb-making supplies, as well as a machine-gun and pistol, were later found in the car.  The following day, also at a police checkpoint, in the nearby Republic of Dagestan, two Islamist rebels opened fire rather than show their papers when their vehicle was stopped, but they were both killed by return fire.  Two Kalashnikovs were found in their car.  One of the men, Viktor Volkov, was wanted for attacks on police.  An attack by unidentified assailants on a police convoy near the village of Dattykh, in Ingushetia, on September 5th, killed six officers and injured several others.  A roadside bomb first struck, then the convoy came under fire from automatic weapons.  Other reports said it was a military convoy, with four soldiers killed, but it is probably the same incident.  Then, on September 6th, a policeman in Grozny, capital of the Chechen Republic, was killed by a bomb planted under his car.

Dagestani Interior Ministry Fills Out Portrait of New Caucasus Emirate Warlord.  The Republic of Dagestan’s pro-Moscow ministry of the interior this week released more information on the new “emir” for the Dagestan region named by the Islamist separatist Caucasus Emirate militia on August 25th (as reported last week in this blog).  Identified at the time as “Abu Muhammed”—which, we can now conclude, is only a nom de guerre—the ministry says he is, in fact, Rustam Aselderov, a 30-year-old from Russia’s predominantly-Buddhist Republic of Kalmykia.  Aselderov—who succeeds Ibragimhalil Daudov, who was killed on St. Valentine’s Day of this year at the age of 51—is already wanted on weapons charges and for racketeering, murder, and terrorist-related activities.  The ministry adds, “He is capable of any violence.”

Rustam Aselderov, a.k.a. Abu Muhammed
SOUTH CAUCASUS—GEORGIA

Dzhioyeva, Denied South Ossetian Presidency in 2011, Forms New Party.  The sidelined winner of the November 2011 presidential election in the de facto independent Republic of South OssetiaAlla Dzhioyeva, this week registered a new political party, called Ossetia–Liberty Square.  Her victory in that vote was annulled in court, and her attempt to serve her term anyway resulted in her being savagely beaten by pro-Moscow thugs and forced to—at the time it appeared permanently—leave politics (discussed in detail at the time in this blog).

SOUTH CAUCASUS—ARMENIA & AZERBAIJAN

Armenia Cuts Ties to Hungary after Azeri Axe Murderer’s Pardon.  The Republic of Armenia on August 31st suspended diplomatic relations with the Republic of Hungary in anger over a Hungarian decision to allow a visit home by an Azerbaijani soldier who had murdered an Armenian military officer in 2004.  The murderer, Lt. Ramil Safarov, was immediately pardoned and released by Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, even after solemn Azerbaijani promises not to interfere with his life sentence.  Safarov had hacked the officer to death with an axe in Hungary during a NATO-sponsored language course over an alleged insult by the officer, Gurgen Markarian, to Azeri national feeling.  Safarov’s defense team pleaded emotional distress as a result of the still-simmering war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.  Safarov’s pardon and release were, however, praised by an exiled leader of the South Azerbaijan Liberation Party, which would like to unite Azerbaijan with the Azeri-populated region of northwestern Iran.

In California, which is home to more Armenians than Armenia itself,
Armenian-Americans marched the streets of Los Angeles to protest Ramil Safarov’s pardon.
These protesters carried Nagorno-Karabakh Republic flags.
New Nagorno-Karabakh President Sworn In.  The parliament of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (N.K.R.) (a.k.a. Artsakh Republic) swore in Bako Sahakyan as the Armenian puppet state’s new president on September 7th in Stepanakert, the N.K.R. capital.  Diplomatic delegations from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transniestria—all of them, like the N.K.R., unrecognized puppet states—were in attendance.

President Bako Sahakyan of the N.K.R.
Armenia Defers Recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh, Saying It’s “Ours Anyway.”  The deputy chair of the Republic of Armenia’s ruling party, the Republican Party of Armenia (R.P.A.), said this week that it was not yet time for Armenia to grant formal diplomatic recognition to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (N.K.R.), a.k.a. the Artsakh Republic—which Armenia and Russia brutally carved out of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s western flank after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) more than 20 years ago.  “We know that Nagorno-Karabakh is ours anyway,” the deputy, Galust Sahakyan, said, forgetting for the moment to pretend that the N.K.R. is not simply an Armenian puppet state.


[Related articles: “South Ossetia Update: ‘Independent’ Elections in an ‘Independent’ State—Russian Style” (Dec. 2011), “The Armenian Genocide Debate: Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Politics of Memory” (April 2012); “The World’s 21 Sexiest Separatists” (April 2012), featuring a profile of the Chechen rebel leader Akhmed Zakayev“Massachusetts Recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh Republic!” (Aug. 2012); “Separatist Football Update: Carnage at a Dagestan–Netherlands Match ...” etc. (Aug. 2012); “That Creepy Underground Islamic Cult in Tatarstan? Turns Out It Was Just a Split-Level—and the Kids Were Fine” (Aug. 2012),  “Caucasus Update: Chechen-Ingush Border Conflict; Female Breakdancing Suicide-Bomber in Dagestan; South Azerbaijani Separatism; Is Georgia Supporting Islamism in Russia?” (Aug. 2012).]

[Also, for those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with a forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  Look for it in spring 2013.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.]

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