Serbia’s Albanians Turn Kosovo–Crimea Parallels on Their Head, Ask Tirana to Annex Preševo Valley

Residents of Preševo, Serbia, celebrating the centenary of Albanian independence in 2012 (BBC)

Diplomacy over the Russian Federation’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula this month has swirled around the question of whether Crimea can or cannot be legitimately compared to Kosovo, the ethnic-Albanian “autonomous” province in southern Serbia which declared independence in 2008 after a 1999 bombing campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) chased Serbia’s ultranationalist government out of the area.  Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, declares that if NATO can unilaterally carve a new territory out of the Republic of Serbia, a Russian ally, citing Serbian oppression of the ethnic-Albanian minority that is a majority in Kosovo, then by the same token Russia can unilaterally separate Crimea from a newly westward-tilting Ukraine by citing Ukrainian government persecution of the ethnic-Russian minority that is a majority there.  Just as the international community has so far not recognized Putin’s annexation of Crimea, Putin himself uses Russia’s veto power as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to block the Republic of Kosovo’s membership in the U.N. General Assembly, even though it is recognized as sovereign by a (slight) majority of the world’s countries.  The United States and NATO reject Putin’s argument, among other things pointing out, quite rightly, that Serbian violations of Kosovar Albanians’ human rights in the 1990s was all too real, while the so-called “fascist” and “neo-Nazi” Ukrainian government’s persecution of ethnic Russians is a shoddy myth perpetrated in the echo chamber of Russia’s (and eastern Ukraine’s) Kremlin-controlled media.  But George W. Bush’s bald-faced lies in defense of his 2003 invasion of Iraq make it easy for Russian nationalists to smirk at such hair-splitting.

Reunification with Albania is a popular idea in Kosovo.

And so the arguments go back and forth about whether Kosovo is equivalent to Crimea.  But this week leaders from the small ethnic-Albanian minority in the non-Kosovo parts of the rump Serbia are using the analogy to equate Russia’s moral position with that of Albania and Kosovo.  To understand this, one must understand that Serbian nationalists have always accused Kosovar separatists of secretly wanting to reunify eventually with Albania in a “Greater Albania” which would also include ethnic-Albanian bits of Montenegro, Macedonia, and even Greece and Serbia.  In this, their fears have been vindicated—sort of.  The leadership in both Albania and Kosovo speak now of Albanian reunification, but only within the context of eventual membership in the European Union (E.U.), and in this view Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia could be members as well (Greece already is one)—with the free movement of peoples making all these borders irrelevant.

The municipalities of Serbia’s Preševo Valley shown in red

Jonuz Musliu, deputy mayor of Bujanovac (Bujanoc, in Albanian), a predominantly-ethnic-Albanian town in southern Serbia’s Preševo Valley, said this week, “If Moscow wants Crimea, then Tirana and Priština should unite with the region of the Preševo Valley” (referring to Tirana and Priština, capitals of Albania and Kosovo, respectively).  Bujanovac and Preševo are both municipalities of between 30,000 and 40,000 people that make up the Preševo Valley region, wedged in the extreme south of Serbia between Kosovo and Macedonia.  Ethnic Albanians make up only one-half of 1% of Serbia’s over 7 million people.  Musliu, who in addition to his municipal role also heads the Party for Democratic Prosperity (P.D.P.), an ethnic-Albanian political party which operates in both Serbia and Macedonia, referred also to a 1992 referendum in which Preševars opted for joining Kosovo.  In those days, Musliu headed something called the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Preshevës, Medvegjës dhe Bujanocit, or U.Ç.P.M.B.), which aimed for three municipalities to secede from what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia–Montenegro).  Medveđa is a much smaller Serbian municipality to the north, along the Kosovo border.

Serbian mayor, Albanian flag: Jonuz Musliu would like to redraw some borders.

The rebuke from Serbia’s cabinet minister in charge of Kosovar matters, Aleksandar Vulin, came swiftly.  Vulin called Musliu’s statements a “threat to the territorial integrity of Serbia” and “urged the international community to loudly and publicly condemn such statements and show that it is against such attitudes,” adding, “When it comes to the latest threats to the territorial integrity and wholeness of the Republic of Serbia, this time arriving from Musliu, I wish to warn that any such statement is very dangerous and could have devastating consequences in the whole territory of Serbia.”

Serbia’s minister for Kosovo affairs Aleksandar Vulin,
portrayed here by the actor Steve Buscemi, reacted angrily to Musliu’s declaration

It is unclear what kind of game Musliu is playing.  Perhaps he is engaging in political theater, voicing support for a politically impossible proposal as a way of pointing up the absurdity of the equivalency between Crimea and Kosovo made by Serbian and Russian nationalists.  Or perhaps this represents a very real Albanian nationalist shift toward making future dreams of “Greater Albania” a crisis on the ground in today’s Balkans.

A very expansive view of a Greater Albania,
based on historical borders, not current ethnic ones.

Either way, Musliu’s comments will cheer ultranationalists among the ethnic Albanians who make up about 5% of Montenegro’s population, and fully a quarter of Macedonia’s.  (In addition, there are about half a million Albanian citizens living in Greece as immigrants, dwarfing the minuscule Albanian-speaking population in the border regions.)  And they will cause pan-Slavic nationalists among the Serbian population—including the fiercely autonomist Serbs of North Kosovo—to dig in their heels.

Another rendering, this time by district/province.

Already, the idea is catching on elsewhere in the Balkans.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina—which in 1995, after a bloody war of secession from Yugoslavia, was separated into two halves—the ethnically Serb half is talking about splitting into two independent states.  Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska, said on March 18th, fresh from a meeting with Russia’s ambassador to Bosnia, “Bring back to Republika Srpska the powers that it had under the Dayton agreement and it will not leave Bosnia.  If you do not bring the powers back, our conviction that we have to move on will get stronger.”  The Serb half (the other half is composed of Croats and Muslim Bosniaks) has gradually ceded many more powers to the federal government in Sarajevo since 1995.  The original Serb goal, during the Bosnian War, had been to attach that half to the Serb-dominated remainder of Yugoslavia, and Serbia–Republika Srpska reunification is a dream that many Serb nationalists have never abandoned.  The parallels with the Soviet break-up are multitudinous.

Bosnia’s internal partition today.  The “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” half
is sometimes called the Muslim–Croat Federation.

By claiming that the Russian government has the right to intervene militarily to protect ethnic Russians anywhere, he has opened Pandora’s Box.  Now every ethnonational group with an ultranationalist streak will be dreaming of a “Greater Such-and-Such” spilling over its neighbors’ borders.  Just watch.

Kosovar and Albanian flags are both common sights in Priština.

(In other Kosovo news, the Greek government announced this week that it was prepared to grant diplomatic recognition to Kosovo, and Slovakia and Romania are apparently to follow suit.  This leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia itself as the only immediate neighbors still opposing Kosovo’s independence.  This will leave Spain and the Republic of Cyprus as the only two of the 28 E.U. members with no diplomatic ties to Kosovo.  Spain is fearful to set an example for separatists in Catalonia and the Basque Country, while Albania’s interests in Kosovo are a bit too much like Turkey’s in the puppet state of Northern Cyprus for Cyprus’s comfort.  On the whole, the Crimea crisis has been good for Kosovar recognition.  Greece, Slovakia, and Romania are surely feeling now that E.U. unity in the face of aggression is now more important than fretting about needlessly antagonizing Serbia, which had been at the source of their waffling on the Kosovo issue over the years.)

[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with my forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  (That is shorter than the previous working title.)  The book, which contains dozens of maps and over 500 flags, will be on shelves and available on Amazon in February 2015.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even though you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this special announcement for more information on the book.]

Raëlian Free-Love UFO Cult Comes Out in Favor of Independent Cascadia

The idea of an independent nation called Cascadia in North America’s temperate northwest, received a thumbs-up this week from an unexpected source: the Raëlian Movement, a mostly Quebec-based flying-saucer religion.

The most commonly seen flag of Cascadia (the “Doug Fir Flag”)

A spokesman for the group, David Dunsmore, said that Cascadia fits the Raëlian ideology of small communities and local government.  For one thing, subdivision of larger countries into smaller states “allows for humanity to become potentially more peaceful and harmonious because the dangers of smaller countries having large military to go to war with each other—they don’t have the means to do that.”

One proposal for Cascadia’s borders.  (There are many.)

More or less inspired by Ernest Callenbach’s 1975 novel Ecotopia, which imagined an egalitarian, environmentally-minded state formed by Oregon, Washington, and most of California seceding from the United States, the idea picked up in a vague and directionless way through the 1980s and ’90s.  A flag was designed in 1994, and in 2001 the Cascadian National Party (C.N.P.) was founded, but timing was not on its side: it was announced on September 9th, and two days later the nation’s attention focused elsewhere.  (By an eerie coincidence, another Pacific Northwest regionalist movement had the same publicity problem, down to the number of days involved: the imaginary State of Jefferson, built out of parts of northern California and southern Oregon, had its first gubernatorial election on December 5, 1941.)  The C.N.P.’s original idea was to form Cascadia from Washington, Oregon, and Canada’s province of British Columbia.  The map on its website today omits B.C.  The rival Cascadia Independence Project has a more bioregionalist vision: its Cascadia has as its eastern border the Continental Divide along the ridge of the Rockies; it stops just short of Anchorage, Alaska, in the north and just short of the San Francisco Bay Area in the south.  It is not clear which version the Raëlians, or their leader Raël, formerly a French race-car driver named Claude Vorilhon, prefers.

Based on Raël’s book, Aliens Took Me to Their Planet, published, coincidentally, the same year as Ecotopia, the group teaches that humanity is the product of genetic seeding by extraterrestrials and is enthusiastically sex-positive, pro-nudist, and anti-clerical.  Last year, as reported at the time in this blog, Raëlians came out in opposition to Quebec’s separatist ruling party, the Parti Québécois (P.Q.), for its bigoted campaign against the display of religious symbols.  The Québécois proposals were designed specifically to target Muslim religious dress, in a bid to pander to francophone anti-immigrant sentiment.  Oddly, a Raëlian bishop opposed the banning of religious displays but opined instead that all religious texts that contained homophobic, religious-chauvinist, or patriarchal ideas should be censored by the state.

Raël

Raëlians have a history of flamboyant bids for media attention.  In 2002, they claimed—falsely, as it turned out, that the Raëlian-based genetics firm Clonaid had created the first human clone; ...

...; since 2008, Raëlians have promoted a national and international “Go Topless Day”; ...

...; earlier this year the Raëlian-run company Clitoraid was chased out of Burkina Faso for founding an institution called the Pleasure Hospital, whose mission is surgical reparation of damage done by female genital cutting; ...

...; and, in a surprisingly tone-deaf public-relations move, they continue to promote the revival of the swastika as a positive symbol ...

They claim to be the numerically largest U.F.O. religion in the world.  On the other hand, that is not so surprising, considering that some of their competition do not exactly have very effective membership-growth strategies ...

(Heaven’s Gate, 1997)

The Cascadia movement has long thirsted for some kind of legitimacy.  They may still have a bit further to go.

[You can read more about Cascadia and many other separatist and new-nation movements, both famous and obscure, in my new book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas just published by Litwin Books under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  The book, which contains 46 maps and 554 flags (or, more accurately, 554 flag images), is available for order now on Amazon.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even if you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this interview for more information on the book.]

Related articles from this blog:
“Greenpeace Declares Independent ‘Glacier Republic’ in Chile’s Andes” (March 2014)

“‘Western Canada’ Separatists Throw in the Towel” (Feb. 2014)

“Quebec Free-Love Saucer Cult Joins Muslim-Headscarf Debate, Suggests Censoring Religious Texts” (Oct. 2013)
“Quebec Separatists Challenge Canadian Tolerance with Proposed Islamic-Headscarf Ban” (Sept. 2013)
“Vancouver Islanders Hope to Be Canada’s 11th Province, and Its Greenest” (Aug. 2013)
“Which Part of ‘Wet’suwet’en Territory’ Don’t They Understand?” (Nov. 2012)

Venice Votes on Independence from Italy This Week; Separatists Prepare Declaration, Transfer of Authority

It is a year for separatist referenda.  Scotland will hold its vote on separation from the United Kingdom on September 18th.  Catalonia, in Spain, will follow suit on December 18th—allowing the separatist government there a full three months to learn from any Scottish mistakes or successes.  Three days ago, on March 16th, the whole global order was called into question as the newly declared Republic of Crimea voted on cutting its ties to Ukraine and joining Russia.  Not to be outdone, the people of Veneto (in Italian, Veneta), the administrative region of which Venice is the capital, on the same day Crimeans went to the polls, began voting on whether to secede from the Italian Republic.

The seven provinces that form Veneto are in northeastern Italy.

An online referendum is now underway, by which Venetians can log in and answer the question, “Do you want Veneto to ­become an independent and sovereign federal republic?”  The vote is organized by Gianluca Busato, a member of the separatist party Venetian Independence (Indipendenza Veneta, or I.V.).  Busato claims that, even though it will be non-binding, it is supported by many local governments and will be “a call to arms.”  The results are to be announced on March 21st.

Gianluca Busato says, “Vote sì!”

Claims of the popularity of independence in Veneto range from 65% to 80%.  Interestingly enough, the phenomenon of Venetian nationalism is distinct from the Northern League (Lega Nord) movement, which for decades has pushed vocally for all of northern Italy, including Venice, to secede as an independent country called Padania (named for the Po River).  The League’s high water mark was its junior membership in Silvio Berlusconi’s ruling coalition until the Euro Zone crisis brought down the Berlusconi and kicked the League out of government too.  In the late 1980s, members of the Veneto League (Ligo Veneta, or L.V.), a branch of Lega Nord, broke away and founded a separate movement to revive the Most Serene Republic of Venice (Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia), which for about a millennium was one of Europe’s most significant economic and naval powers and a major cultural center, until the Hapsburgs and Napoleon Bonaparte dismantled it in the late 18th century.  These L.V. members, in the jargon of Italian separatist politics, are a species of “Venetist” called “Serenissimists,” as distinct from the Northern League’s “Padanists.”  They went so far as to found a provisional Venetian government, calling into question the legality of the 1866 referendum which incorporated Veneto into the new Kingdom of Italy during the Risorgimento.  In a 1997 publicity stunt, a group of Serenissimists “invaded” the iconic St. Mark’s Plaza in Venice with an elaborately and patriotically decorated military tank.

The Northern League’s Umberto Bossi tried but failed
to coax Venetians toward Padanism.

The more serious and mainstream L.V. is much more popular and in fact is Veneto’s ruling party.  Veneto’s president, Luca Zaia, is the L.V. party leader.  Lega Nord, which is far more right-wing and has been buffeted lately by corruption scandals and outcries over racist, anti-immigrant comments by its politicians, has far fewer supporters in this part of the north; they got 10.5% of the vote in the 2013 regional elections, to L.V.’s 35%.  Ironically, it is Venice that Lega Nord envisions as the capital of a future Padania, rather than Turin or Milan, two more natural choices, which are Lega Nord strongholds.  The choice of Venice is probably a vain attempt to shore up support for Padanism in the northeast.

Veneto’s president, Luca Zaia, demonstrating what he’d like to do to Italy

However, the current referendum’s backers, I.V., are a far smaller splinter group which is very libertarian in its orientation.  I.V. got only 1.1% in the 2013 elections.  This despite the fact that they had organized a large independence rally in Venice the previous year (reported at the time in this blog), which culminated in the delivery to the regional government, by gondola, of a declaration of independence.

Fringe I.V. may be, and non-binding the referendum may be, but one I.V. spokesman, Lodovico Pizzati, sounds very serious when he discusses its implications. “If there is a majority yes vote,” he told a reporter, “we have scholars drawing up a declaration of independence and there are businesses in the region who say they will begin paying taxes to local authorities instead of to Rome.”  The new state is to be called the Republic of Veneto (Repubblica Veneta).  Pizzati is a World Bank economist who currently lives in California.  Another I.V. member, Raffaele Serafini, told media, “Venetians not only want out of Italy, but we also want out of the euro, the E.U. and NATO.”  This view is distinct from the pro-Brussels separatist sentiment found in Scotland or Catalonia, but it is not clear if most Venetans share Serafini’s views.  If so, then one of the obstacles to Scottish separatists reaching a majority—fear of ejection from the E.U.—is one which Venetists don’t need to worry about.

Lodovico Pizzati in St. Mark’s Plaza in 2012

Veneto’s nearly 5 million people are about a twelfth of Italy’s population.  Nonetheless, it constitutes about a tenth of Italy’s gross domestic product (G.D.P.), and separatists point out that a Republic of Veneto would be Europe’s seventh-strongest economy.  As in many of Italy’s administrative regions, Veneto’s dialect of Italian is increasingly referred to as a separate language.

Venetian flags mingle with Lombard and Padanian ones at a rally.

As Zaia put it, “The push for independence comes from the people.  It is a democratic request born of Rome’s indifference.  If Barcelona [i.e., Catalonia] gets independence, Veneto could adopt the same method and get it too.  We have knocked politely on the door of federalism, but it did not open.  Now we will break down the door.”

[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with a forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  Look for it some time in mid 2014.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.]

Lega Nord’s vision of the future is different from that of Venetists and Serenissimists.

Related articles from this blog:

“Lega Nord, Flemish Separatists, Others at Secret Vienna Summit Plot Far-Right Slate for Strasbourg” (Nov. 2013)

“Italophone Swiss Bid Ciao but Not Auf Wiedersehen to Right-Wing Ticinese Nationalist Giuliano Bignasca” (March 2013)

“10 Separatist Movements to Watch in 2013” (Dec. 2012)

“Venice Declares Independence—via Gondola; Gibraltar, Kosovo Jostle for Football Independence; Musqueam Win Vancouver Condo Battle; Nuwaubians in Georgia; Mauritius Rallies Africans to Take Chagos Isles Back from U.K.: The Week in Separatist News” (Oct. 2012)

“Valtellina: A History Lesson on Europe’s Tense North–South Border” (July 2012)

“The World’s 21 Sexiest Separatists” (including Lega Nord’s Renzo Bossi) (April 2012)

“Umberto Bossi’s ‘Republic of Padania’ Expands into Central Europe” (Jan. 2012)

“10 Separatist Movements to Watch in 2012” (Dec. 2011)

What Next after Crimea’s “Referendum”?

Crimean Russians celebrating their referendum result

Two major votes were held on Sunday, March 16th.  In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (a.k.a. North Korea), parliamentary elections were held for the country’s 687 constituencies.  In each one, only one candidate ran, and that candidate was hand-picked by Kim Jon-un’s Communist dictatorship.  In each case, the candidate received 100% of the votes, without any abstentions.  The turnout was 99.97%—slightly down from the turnout in 2009, which was 99.98%.  The official news agency explained that the results affirmed “the absolute support and trust of all voters” in the central government.  Elections like this defy parody, although the satirical newspaper the Onion does its best, as in a 2007 report that Kim Jong-il’s “approval rating plummets to 120%.”

Democracy, Crimean style

The other vote on Sunday was, of course, the referendum in Crimea on whether to join the Russian Federation, and the results there should be given no more credence and taken no more seriously as an actual mandate than those from North Korea.  As in North Korea, the ballot did not really offer a choice, and, as in North Korea, the vote was held in an atmosphere of terror and military rule.

This is what Crimeans were told their choices were.
In reality, they had no choice at all.

Three weeks ago, so-called “self-defense forces” and other paramilitaries—in actual fact, Russian-equipped regulars or irregulars taking orders directly from the Kremlin—forcibly took over the parliament and all government buildings in the Republic of Ukraine’s constituent Autonomous Republic of Crimea and installed a pro-Kremlin leadership (as reported at the time in this blog).  On March 11th, the new unelected parliament declared an intent to secede from Ukraine with the ultimate goal of joining the Russian Federation.  The referendum held on the 16th offered two choices: (1) joining the Russian Federation and (2) remaining part of Ukraine under the terms of the 1992 constitution.  But both options amount to the same thing.  The 1992 constitution was implemented after Crimea’s first referendum and declaration of independence (later retracted), in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The 1992 constitution granted Crimea broad autonomy and the right to chose its own path, up to and including possibly secession.  The constitutional reforms following the Orange Revolution of 2004 left less leeway for Crimea, putting its constitution under the authority of Ukraine’s.  So returning to the 1992 constitution means awarding the Crimean government the right to secede—and join Russia.  The result is the same.

“Heads, I win; tails, you lose”
Even so, on Sunday the annexation-to-Russia option got 96.77% of the vote, with 2.51% for the 1992-constitution option.  Turnout was reported as over 80%.  There were no exit polls, but indications are that the Crimean Tatar minority, who are between 12% and 13% of the population, boycotted the referendum, and so probably did many ethnic Ukrainians, who are just under a quarter of the population.  (Most residents are ethnically Russian.)  In Sevastopol, which within Ukraine’s internal structure is, like the capital, Kiev (Kyiv), an oblast- (province-) level municipality separate from the Autonomous Republic of Ukraine, a separate referendum was held, since Sevastopol had also been taken over by Russian forces.  (Sevastopol is about 72% ethnic-Russian and about 22% ethnic-Ukrainian.)  There, annexation to Russia was approved 95.60% to 3.37%.  Initial official pronouncements that the Sevastopol vote had an 80% turnout were called into suspicion when outside observers took a closer look at the numbers.  It seems 474,137 residents cast ballots, even though at last count Sevastopol’s voting-age population was 385,462.  An election worthy of Kim Jong-un indeed: turnout in Sevastopol was 120%.

The following day, March 17th, the unelected Russian-installed legislatures and governments of both Crimea and Sevastopol declared independence together as the new Republic of Crimea.  The word Autonomous was dropped, since of course that word implies autonomy from and within something.  Almost immediately, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was recognizing its independence, and the Russian parliament began a fast-tracked process to admit the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.

So what happens next?  Here is a rundown of how things might proceed from here on out:

Crimea’s status
Crimea has now joined the world’s small club of partially recognized status, those which are recognized by some other sovereign states but not enough (or not the right ones, since Russia, the United States, and China can veto applications) to be in the United Nations General Assembly.  Others include the State of Palestine, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (mostly occupied by Morocco), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey), and two Russian puppet states within Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (more on them below).

But Russia will probably not bother to cajole knee-jerk anti-U.S. countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua and development-funds-hungry Pacific islets like Tuvalu and Nauru to recognize Crimea, as it has successfully done with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as discussed earlier in this blog).  Instead, independence is here just an antechamber to annexation.  This may happen within a matter of months.  Already Crimea has adopted the ruble, and the Russian military is its de facto defense force.  At that point a much larger contingent of countries than the Georgian republics’ short list of diplomatic partners might formally recognize Crimea as part of Russia, and this would especially be true of the former Soviet republics lined up to join Putin’s new Eurasian Union trade bloc—Belarus and Kazakhstan—as well as those currently negotiating their entry, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan might or might not follow suit.  But this is largely academic.  After all: most countries in the world engage with Taiwan, and with the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, both politically and economically, as sovereign nations while not diplomatically recognizing them as separate from China or Somalia, respectively.

As a new member of the Federation, the Republic of Crimea would not, at that point, have to change its name.  The 83 members of the Russian Federation include 20 “republics,” mostly named for distinct nationalities like Chechens, Karelian Finns, Kalmyks, Volga Tatars, or Tuvans.  In fact, Putin will probably make at least a very good show of granting Crimea some of the genuine self-government that the Federation’s 83 “federal subjects” were promised under President Boris Yeltsin but then later denied when Putin came to power.  The Republic of Tatarstan and the Chechen Republic, in particular, had their nominal autonomy stripped from them and are now ruled by Kremlin-appointed governors.  On the other hand, even if Putin allows sham elections for governor in a way that he does not in Tatarstan or Chechnya, the spectacle of this week’s “referendum” indicates that the result might be the same: direct rule, with phrases like “autonomous republic” being a cruel Orwellian joke, just as it was in Soviet times.  Which brings us to ...

Crimean Tatars
But, unlike Chechnya and Tatarstan, Crimea is overwhelmingly ethnic-Russian.  The closest thing to a titular national group the republic has is the Crimean Tatars, the peninsula’s indigenous Turkic-speaking Muslims, who were deported en masse by Josef Stalin in the 1940s and have only in recent years begun to trickle home.  They make up between 12% and 13% of the population at last count (or less, since those numbers do not include Sevastopol, which has almost no Tatars).  Gone for good now, surely, is the special arrangement by which Tatars were guaranteed, as the indigenous people, a certain share of seats in the Crimean parliament.  But the loud expressions of concern in the West and in the international community for the beleaguered and despised Tatars have already maneuvered Putin into declaring that the linguistic and cultural rights of Tatars will be respected and protected.  He especially needs to make this point because it was just this sort of protection which the entire invasion of Crimea was supposed to offer to the supposedly oppressed Russian language and culture under the supposedly fascist and neo-Nazi and anti-Russian government which took power in Ukraine when President Viktor Yanukovych (whom Russia still recognizes as the Ukrainian president) fled the country.  But if Putin was able to convincingly lie to Russians and Crimeans about those supposed atrocities, will he also be able to lie to them about atrocities that might now occur against Tatars?  It is possible.  Make no mistake, it is unlikely that Putin will actually go after the Tatars.  (Some of the complexities of the Tatar situation were explored last week in an article in this blog.)  So long as they are too scared to stage an uprising, he won’t feel it necessary; he already has Crimea.  But among the armed groups controlling the Crimean peninsula right now are not only Russian regular soldiers but actual “self-defense groups” (i.e. ad hoc armed militias of ethnic Russians, some but not all of them Kremlin-paid provocateurs), Cossacks, Russian motorcycle gangs, and pro-Kremlin mercenaries from Serbia, Chechnya, and perhaps elsewhere.  No one knows to what extent the Kremlin will be able to control these groups if interethnic violence somewhow erupts and, God forbid, an actual pogrom begins.  This, of course, is what Tatars fear.  And a pogrom could change all of the international dynamics regarding Crimea—in particular stoking jihadist insurgencies in the rest of Russia, turning Volga Tatars in Tatarstan against their Kremlin-appointed Uncle Tom president, and inviting military intervention by Turkey or Azerbaijan.

Russian policy toward religious minorities circa 1847.
Let’s hope there’s been some evolution since then.

The rest of Ukraine
But what of the rest of Ukraine, where Russian-speakers dominate in the eastern and southern areas?  On March 5th, a mysterious provocateur and former neo-Nazi named Pavel Gubarev led an armed takeover by ethnic Russians of the government buildings in Donetsk, an industrial in eastern Ukraine, and declared an independent Donetsk Republic, with an explicit invitation for Russia to invade and “defend” them (as reported at the time in this blog).  Gubarev was arrested the next day by Ukrainian federal police, and unrest has been simmering in the city—capital of the ethnic-Russian Yanukovych’s home oblast—since then, including lethal rioting.  Some of the same ingredients are in place that preceded the Crimean takoever—a call for Russian help, demonstrations full of Kremlin-imported provocateurs teetering toward uncontrollable violence, and talk of the “fascists” running Ukraine now.  One difference is that neither Donetsk Oblast nor any of the other Russian-dominated ones (Luhansk, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, etc.) is a coherent historical entity in the way that Crimea is.  Another is that it is tougher to draw a line between ethnic-Russian-dominated and ethnic-Ukrainian-dominated areas of the mainland.  Nonetheless, many ordinary Ukrainians fear that a Russian invasion of the Ukrainian mainland could begin at any moment.  Officially, Putin says that he has no plans to annex Ukraine, but that’s exactly what he said about Crimea mere weeks ago.  Officially, Putin has proposed that as a “compromise,” what remains of Ukraine become a politically neutral federative state, barred from ever joining the European Union (E.U.) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the oblasts converted to autonomous republics able to govern themselves and to align themselves economically and geopolitically as they please.  This would be a recipe for fragmentation and, if implemented, it would create a Donetsk Republic, a Kharkiv Republic, etc., and these would follow Crimea in joining the Federation.  More likely, Putin means this as an opening offer in a set of negotiations just beginning in which he assumes he holds all the cards.  A more radical proposals, which may yet become ascendant among Russian ultra-nationalists in Ukraine, is one mooted by Russians in Crimea last month (as reported at the time in this blog): to put the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine (at that point Crimea was envisioned as part of it) together in something called the Federated States of Malorossiya, using the name “Little Russia” which in Czarist times was used to describe much of Ukraine.  Kharkiv would be its capital—this having been the interim capital of the Bolshevik-ruled Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.) during the Russian Civil War in the late 1910s, when anti-Kremlin forces controlled Kiev.  Kharkiv, next to Donetsk, has been the scene of most of the worst unrest in recent weeks.  One thing is clear: Putin wants as much of Ukraine as possible, and he seems inclined to push things as far as he can.

Russia’s other puppet states—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria
For the moment, Crimea is in the same category as the partially recognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see above), which split away from the newly independent Georgia in the early 1990s amid civil war and then were declared fully independent in 2008 after Russia defeated Georgia handily in response to a Georgian attempt to retake the territories.  Recognized only by Russia, Tuvalu, Nauru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are in many ways part of the Russian Federation already.  The majority of their citizenry holds Russian passports, and their athletes have competed as Russians in the Olympics (as discussed in this blog).  In 2012, all those Russian passport-holders in the republic went strongly for Putin in an election that treated the territories as separate electoral constituencies.  However, South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders and residents are getting impatient.  Many of them feel that they lack both the legitimacy of fully recognized statehood and the perks that come from being a full-fledged member of the Russian Federation.  In the long term, Putin talks about them joining the Eurasian Union as full members, which would be an enhancement of their independence and would economically integrate them more closely with Russia.

But the fast-tracking of Crimean accession to the Federation is likely to increase Abkhaz and Ossetian frustration.  It is not clear why Putin has not absorbed them already.  There are a few possible factors.  One, it would further antagonize Georgia and, by extension, the West and the international community.  But the events of the past month show a sharp shift by Putin, who seems very explicitly to no longer care who criticizes him internationally.  Second, Russians are minorities in the two republics, unlike in Crimea (only 9% in Abkhazia, where Abkhaz are just over 50%, and 3% in South Ossetia, where two-thirds are Ossetes).  He could not use the same arguments about “protecting Russians abroad” as he does for Crimea.

Victors in the South Ossetia War, Putin’s 2008 dress rehearsal for Crimea

Third, there are security issues.  Abkhazia is mostly Christian, but it is 15% Muslim, most of those being Abkhaz.  And the Abkhaz are considered part of the larger Circassian ethnic group whose plight cast a shadow over the Winter Olympics last month in Sochi and is the rationale for the Islamist insurgency that has turned the North Caucasus into a war zone; North Caucasus Islamists helped out when Abkhaz fought for and won its de facto independence from Georgia after the fall of Communism.  Circassians are mostly moderate Muslims, and Abkhaz Muslims even more so, but so were most Caucasus Muslims in Russia until the Chechen Wars radicalized them.  Annexing Abkhazia might cause the insurgency to spread there.  South Ossetia is mostly Christian and it will probably want to reunite with North Ossetia, which is in Russia and is also predominantly Christian (as discussed in this blog).  But the Islamist terrorist Caucasus Emirate movement claims North Ossetia as part of its territory, so this complicates things.  Also, annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia would make tens of thousands of ethnic Georgians into Russian Federation citizens, something that is not currently the case.  This would drive Russia and Georgia much further apart (again, to the extent that Putin cares about things like that anymore).

Putin with Abkhazia’s president, Alexandr Ankvab

But there are ethnic Russians in Transnistria, the Russian-backed but as yet unrecognized puppet state carved in 1990 out of the eastern sliver of newly-independent Moldova.  (It is also called Trans-Dniester, Transdniestria, and, formally, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.)  Here, the parallels with Crimea are much stronger.  But the numbers are not as Kremlin-friendly.  At last count, Transnistria was about perfectly evenly divided among Moldovans (i.e. Romanians), Russians, and Ukrainians, with ethnic Moldovans having a slight edge.  Here, though, is where nearly all of the former Moldavian S.S.R.’s Russians live.  And Putin has made the protection of ethnic Russians who, in the famous phrase, went to sleep in the Soviet Union and woke up the next morning in foreign countries a priority. It would be easy for him to manufacture a provocation for an invasion.  But he is unlikely to do this until he has to some extent managed to annex Ukraine’s Odessa oblast, which borders Transnistria; this would link Transnistria up with the Russian heartland via Crimea.  Annexing Transnistria would also have the benefit of balkanizing Moldova in the way that is happening in Ukraine, and also create a territorial conflict that would permanently discourage Moldova from joining the E.U. or NATO—which most Moldovans want to do, probably in the form of reunification with Romania.  A further complication is the autonomous republic of Gagauzia within Moldova, 82% of the population of which are Gagauz—a Turkic-speaking ethnic group, most of whom are Orthodox Christians.  (Moldovans and Bulgarians each make up 5% of Gagauzia’s population, and Russians are about 4%.)  Gagauzia last month held a referendum (reported on at the time in this blog) in which 99% of citizens said they wanted to declare independence if Moldova attempted Romanian unification.  That won’t happen anyway, so long as Moldova still claims Transnistria, but in that same referendum 98% of Gagauzians said they wanted closer ties with Putin’s Eurasian Union, not with the E.U.  So Gagauz they may be, but they seem very open to being convinced that joining the Russian Federation would be a good idea.

[Mere hours after this blog post was written, a reader called my attention to today’s news development: Transnistria is indeed formally appealing to Moscow for membership in the Russian Federation.  I will be blogging on this soon.]

The other unrecognized puppet state in the former Soviet Union is the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (N.K.R.), an ethnic-Armenian-dominated enclave within the Republic of Azerbaijan which the newly independent Republic of Armenia conquered in 1991 and established as a puppet state, heavily funded by the ultranationalist Armenian-American diaspora.  Since Azerbaijan, a Turkic-speaking country, is strongly aligned with Turkey, the U.S., and NATO and against their traditional enemy Iran, and since Armenians regard any Turks as devils, Russia quietly supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh War and supports the N.K.R. as well, but neither it nor Armenia has formally recognized it.  If Putin succeeds in annexing Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria, and if, as expected, Armenia joins the Eurasian Union, there is no reason why he would not try something similar in Nagorno-Karabakh.  While Armenians are strongly nationalistic enough to not want to be part of the Russian Federation, these developments might still prompt a full Russian and Armenian diplomatic recognition of the N.K.R. and its membership in the Eurasian Union.

Other former Soviet republics with ethnic-Russian populations
But beyond Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, there are other parts of the former Soviet Union where there are ethnic Russians.  The highest numbers are in the Baltic States, especially Latvia, which was traumatically divided in its opinions in 2012 over a referendum on whether to grant Russian the status of an official language.  Russian-speakers make up just over a quarter of Latvia’s population, and they are highly concentrated in the east, forming a majority for example in Dagauvpils, Latvia’s second-largest city (and 40% of the capital, Riga).  Around the time of the referendum (as reported at the time in this blog), there were attempts by Russian nationalists to link their autonomist cause with that of the Latgalians, a Latvian cultural group who sometimes consider themselves a separate nationality and whose territory includes Dagauvpils.  Those efforts failed, as did the referendum, narrowly.  Despite these dynamics, however, which echo the demographic situations in Moldova and Ukraine that make these “soft targets” for Putin’s imperialism, the Baltic States—the other two are Estonia and Lithuania—are safe.   In 2004, the three Baltic States joined the E.U. and NATO.  Any military moves by Putin on their territories would put Russia on an immediate war footing with the U.S., France, the United Kingdom and 25 other countries.  That could mean nuclear war.  He has already exerted some economic pressure on the Baltics, but NATO warplanes have stepped up their flyovers of Baltic territory, so he won’t touch them, much as he’d like to.

Plenty of Russians (shown in red) live outside the Russian Federation.

Belarus, which still has a Soviet-style dictatorship in place and is often called the least free country in Europe, is only 8% Russia, as against 84% Belarussian, but that ethnic and linguistic divide is fairly blurry.  Belarus has even less of a history as a state independent of Russia than Ukraine does.  In the late 1990s, Yeltsin wove the two countries together as the Union State of Belarus and Russia, and it is as close to being annexed to Russia as one could formally be.  It is lock-step loyal in its foreign policy, and Belarussians do not seem to care much if they are in Russia or in independent Belarus.  In fact, joining Russia could hardly leave them worse off.  This is low-hanging fruit.  Consider Belarus part of Russia already.

Belarus’s president, Alexander Lukashenko

A bit more complicated are the formerly-Soviet republics of Central Asia.  Kazakhstan, in particular, is about 24% ethnic Russian and about 63% Kazakh, with most of the Russians concentrated in the north, along the Russian border.  When Communism fell in 1990, it was more like 40% Russian and 38% Kazakh, before Russians began emigrating in great numbers.  But among the Russians who remain are some Cossacks.  The Semirechye Cossacks declared the independence of Kazakhstan’s northern reaches right after Kazakhstan’s own independence was thrust upon it, with the idea that they would eventually join Russia.  That never got momentum, and nor did another secessionist movement around the same time, in Ust’-Kamengorsk (now Oskemen), capital of East Kazakhstan oblast.  Today, Cossack separatism in Kazakhstan is concentrated in the formerly Russian region of Transcaspia, notably Mangystau oblast, where Russians make up a third and Kazakhs about half of the population.  As its name suggests, that is right on the Caspian Sea, which means it is a highly strategic region for controlling Central Asia’s energy resources.  And if Transcaspia is annexed, just next door to the east is Uzbekistan’s Republic of Karakalpakstan, which U.S. diplomats have called a powderkeg with a roiling separatist movement by the Turkic-speaking Karakalpaks, a situation in that closed society about which little is known.  Karakalpaks are just over a third of the population; an unknown number is Russian.  Will Putin decide that they—and their energy resources—need “protecting” too?  If so, Putin might use some of the same historical arguments as he uses in Crimea, and he might have Kazakhstan—already a Eurasian Union founding member—on his side as well: Karakalpakstan was part of the Kazakh S.S.R. until Stalin transferred it to the Uzbek S.S.R. in 1936, as a way of dividing the Kazakh population, to whom Karakalpaks are more closely related than to Uzbeks.

The Republic of Karakalpakstan: just to its west is Transcaspia,
whose Cossacks want to rejoin Russia

Would Putin really move to take (i.e. retake) more territory in Central Asia?  This worried Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh president, who put his armed forces on high alert when Crimea was invaded and stepped up patrols along the border with Russia.  Putin had to summon him to Moscow and reassure him—and when I say reassure, I mean threaten—that Ukraine tipping to the West would hurt the Eurasian Union as a whole.  Turkmenistan is the most economically independent of the Central Asian republics, but Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are, like Kazakhstan, susceptible to Kremlin pressure.  Does this mean that Putin will carve out the pieces of those countries that he wants, or does that mean that he doesn’t feel he has to?  Time will tell.

Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev: is his country next?

International response
And what of the international community’s response to all this?  Russia’s ally on the U.N. Security Council, abstained from the Council’s vote in which Russia vetoed a U.S. resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea.  For China, the Crimean adventure smells too much like “separatism,” which Russia is also, hypocritically, nominally against.  As for the West, sanctions are already being imposed by the U.S. and the E.U., but there is not much to them so far.  Germany is leading the faction in the E.U. making the argument—it doesn’t put it quite like this, though—that Russia and western Europe are too economically entangled, with too many oligarchs parking their money in Western banks and too much oil and natural gas flowing east to west, for any sanctions against Russia not to harm the West as well.  President Barack Obama’s critics, including Senator John McCain, think the U.S. should be proactively arming Ukraine.  This assumes that if Russia invades Ukraine’s mainland, it will make sense to mount a full military defense.  Even with Western arms, Ukraine would lose such a war.  Their choice would be to roll over, let Russia take half their country, and hope for sanctions and diplomacy and a better day farther down the road, or fight and maybe lose the entire country.  No one wants a nuclear war, so there’s very little the West can reasonably do that it is not already doing to retaliate against Russia.  The Cold War is over; this isn’t about socialism or capitalism or freedom or anything else.  It’s about raw, imperial power.  The U.S. and NATO invades places like Libya and Iraq and Afghanistan so they can put in the governments they want and expand their control, and Russia does the same where it wants to.  There’s no “global policeman”—certainly not the U.N., whose main function is to protect the shared interests of the Security Council permanent members and ignore the unshared interests.  No, this is just history as it’s always been.

[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with my forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  The book is now in the layout phase and should be on shelves, and available on Amazon, by early fall 2014.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even though you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook.]

[Thanks to Mike Hitchcock.]

Related articles from this blog:
“Islam and the Second Crimean War: Russian Invasion a Calamity for Tatars but a Recruitment Windfall for Jihadists” (March 2014)

“Donetsk Putsch Nipped in Bud, but Could Odessa or Kharkiv Be Next as Russia Eyes Ukrainian Mainland?” (March 2014)

“Second Crimean War Update: Western Credibility, Russian Lies, and Putin’s Next Steps (Hint: ‘Donetsk Republic’)” (March 2014)

“Ukraine Loses Grip on Crimea, Prepares for Open War with Russia; Role of Far Right in New Kiev Regime Unclear” (Feb. 2014)

“Putin and Ukraine’s Ultranationalist Russians Light the Fuse: Second Crimean War Begins” (Feb. 2014)

“Games Begin! Ukrainian Hijacking, Putin Rounds Up Dissidents” (Feb. 2014)

“Yet Another Genocide Olympics: 10 Political Causes Sure to Disrupt the Sochi Games” (Feb. 2014)

“Minuscule Gagauzia Votes 99% to Declare Independence If Moldova Attempts Romanian Reunification” (Feb. 2014)

“Partition Lines in Ukraine Sharpen as Crimean Russians Call for Separate ‘Malorossiya’” (Jan. 2014)

“Will Ukraine Crisis Become Second Crimean War? Tatars and Russian Nationalists Take Sides” (Jan. 2014)

“Is Ossetian Reunification Just Russian Irredentism by Another Name?” (Jan. 2014)

“10 Separatist Movements to Watch in 2014” (Dec. 2013)

“Abkhazia & South Ossetia Won’t Compete in Sochi Olympics, I.O.C. Declares” (Oct. 2013)

“‘Separatism’ Added to List of Things Russians Aren’t Allowed to Talk about” (Sept. 2013)

“She Recognizes Me, She Recognizes Me Not: Fickle Vanuatu Dumps Abkhazia for Georgia” (March 2013)

“Road Dispute Pushes Town near Moscow to Declare Independence from Russia—but with Dusted-Off Fascist Ukrainian Flags, Oddly Enough” (Oct. 2012)

“Gagauzia Threatens to Secede from Moldova If Nationalists Push Reunification with Romania” (Sept. 2012)

“That Creepy Underground Islamic Cult in Tatarstan? Turns Out It’s Just a Split-Level—and the Kids Were Fine” (Aug. 2012)

“The Armenian Genocide Debate: Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Politics of Memory” (April 2012)

“Language Referendum Pits Latvians against Russians” (Feb. 2012)

“South Ossetia Update: ‘Independent’ Elections in an ‘Independent’ State—Russian Style” (Dec. 2011)

“Transnistria’s Limbo to Continue Indefinitely” (Nov. 2011)