Showing posts with label Second Crimean War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Second Crimean War. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 22, 2014

Russian Ultranationalists in Odessa Go for Whole Enchilada, Declare “Republic of Novorossiya”


It is in eastern Ukraine where the Russian ultranationalist separatists—organized and staffed, beyond doubt, by Kremlin-commanded forces—have grabbed the most headlines: seizing government buildings in more than a score of cities, resulting in lethal standoffs with the Ukrainian military.


But it is in western Ukraine that the pro-Russia secessionists have become most ambitious.  Last week in this blog I discussed the declaration on April 16th of a “People’s Republic of Odessa” in Ukraine’s southwest, bordering Transnistria and Moldova, though at the time it seemed to be mostly an online phenomenon, not yet a street-politics movement, though it was calling for one.  Now Russian media are reporting a rally in Odessa’s Kulikovo Field where crowds are declaring an “Odessa Republic of Novorossiya.”  “New Russia,” or Novorossiya, is the name given in Czarist times to much of what is now Ukraine, but especially the flatlands just north of Crimea, including Odessa and spilling into the areas in today’s southeastern Ukraine that have been declared the independent “People’s Republics” of Lugansk (Luhansk), Kharkov (Kharkiv), and, most dramatically, Donetsk.

Valery Kaurov in 2008, during an anti-NATO uprising around Odessa
One Valery Kaurov has been named the “people’s president” of the Odessa Republic of Novorossiya.  He is currently the head of the Union of Orthodox Citizens of Ukraine.  (Nearly all of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking minority are Eastern Orthodox Christians, while most of the country’s Catholics live in the Ukrainian-speaking west.)  Kaurov addressed the rally via Skype, since, apparently, he had fled the city fearing arrest.  More information on the rally, including its size and who organized it, has so far been difficult to find.

Pro-Russian activists in Odessa recently
The new republic also apparently recognizes the “independence” of the Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kharkov republics as well as a new entity called the Carpathian Ruthenian People’s Republic.  Carpathian Ruthenia, now called Ukraine’s Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) oblast, which formed the eastern part of Czechoslovakia between the world wars, is home to a minority of Rusyns (Ruthenians) and was the site of an aborted declaration of independence in 2008 that was presumed by Ukrainian authorities to be the work of Russian provocateurs.

One version of the Odessa “national” flag as it appeared online recently
But why Odessa in particular (a question posed not so long ago in this blog)?  Founded by Catherine the Great in 1794 on land just conquered from the Ottoman Empire, Odessa has long been considered a Russian, rather than Ukrainian, city.  And, as Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, told the world at his recent press event, “Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Odessa were not part of Ukraine in Czarist times, they were transferred in 1920.  Why?  God knows.  Then for various reasons these areas were gone, and the people stayed there—we need to encourage them to find a solution.  We must do everything to help these people to protect their rights and independently determine their own destiny.”  (He has also taken lately to using the term Novorossiya.)  Putin also allegedly mentioned Odessa as a possible site of Russian military intervention as long ago as his early-February phone call with the United States president, Barack Obama.

What’s old is new again: borders in Ukraine in 1918,
during the chaos of the Bolshevik–Menshevik civil war
Moreover, as the Economist recently summed up Putin’s possible next geostrategic moves: “ One possibility is opening up a land corridor to Crimea through Donetsk and Mariupol.  Another is a corridor extending from Crimea to Transdniestria, a pro-Russian breakaway territory in Moldova which is home to a Russian army, by way of Odessa.  A third, extreme, option might be splitting the country along the Dnieper.”  It is of course option no. 2, plowing a corridor to Transnistria (a.k.a. Transdniestria, a.k.a. Pridnestrovia), that would make Odessa key.  Transnistria, which is ethnically about a third Russian, a third Ukrainian, and a third Moldovan (i.e. Romanian), is a sliver of land occupied by Russian troops which declared independence from Moldova in 1991.  Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, within Georgia’s internationally recognized boundaries, it has not become a formal puppet state diplomatically recognized by Moscow.  Unlike Crimea, it has not been annexed.  But it craves either option.  Transnistria’s foreign minister has now repeatedly asked for some version of a Crimea-style path to annexation, starting with formal recognition.  But the Kremlin has been coy on the issue so far, though it has raised alarms about the Ukrainian military’s sealing of the border between Transnistria and Odessa Oblast in order to prevent the further westward flow of Russian matériel or even personnel.

Nina Shtanski, Transnistria’s minister for foreign affairs, has set fashion trends
worldwide on the question of where to position buttons on a power suit.
And, of course, calling everything in between Novorossiya would have the argument of efficiency—eliminating, in terms of symbolism and in terms of groping for and waiting for provocations, the painfully slow process of “retaking” Ukraine oblast by oblast, as was begun in Crimea.  Putin wants the whole enchilada.  And the whole enchilada is called Novorossiya.  Watch this space.

Another view: this image, circulating on the Internet, is said to be of a map produced by the Communist Party of Ukraine.  It shows modern Ukraine divided into (clockwise from upper left: Ukraine, the Dneprovsko-Slobozhanskaia Republic (including Kharkiv and half of Kyiv), the Donbas Republic (Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Luhansk), the Republic of Crimea, and the Republic of Novorossiya (including Odessa and Kherson oblasts).


Two alternate flags of an independent “Novorossiya”
declared very briefly, and without effect, in 1992

[You can read more about these and other separatist movements, both famous and obscure, in my new book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas just published by Litwin Books under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  The book, which contains 46 maps and 554 flags (or, more accurately, 554 flag images), is available for order now on Amazon.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even if you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this special announcement for more information on the book.]



Thanks to Olga Buchel for directing me to some of the information used in this article.

Friday, March 14, 2014

Islam and the Second Crimean War: Russian Invasion a Calamity for Tatars but a Recruitment Windfall for Jihadists

Tatars rallying in Crimea in a plea for Turkish intervention
The Second Crimea War is about to burst forth, it seems.  The self-styled, Kremlin-installed government in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea declared on March 11th that it was now independent as simply the Republic of Crimea, and it will be holding a referendum on annexation to the Russian Federation in two days’ time (on March 16th).  But it can hardly be called a fair referendum: it will be held under occupation by the Russian military—something President Vladimir Putin, insanely, still denies is the case.  (The Kremlin says that the highly trained, Kalashnikov-toting soldiers in brand-new unmarked uniforms being transported around Crimea in Russian military vehicles are spontaneously organized “self-defense forces” of the local ethnic-Russian population.)  Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is massing its military forces on NATO states that border Ukraine—Poland, Romania—while Russia mobilizes troops along Ukraine’s rim in the Kremlin vassal state of Belarus and in the Russian plains along the Black Sea.  Whether this is just to intimidate Crimean voters, or whether it heralds in invasion and occupation of the Ukrainian mainland’s Russian-speaking regions as well is difficult to say.

Crimean Tatars feel more European than Russian.
The Western and Russian media are both portraying this conflict as a showdown between East and West, a settling of scores left over from the Cold War.  It is definitely that.  But the presence of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people in the Crimean peninsula complicates matters.  They are Muslim, and their history of ill treatment at Russian hands is extensive and bitter.  They will suffer the most if Russia’s plans succeed.  And it is the Tatar factor that could give the Second Crimean War a religious dimension as well and entwine it in a larger geopolitical battle with and among Muslim regional powers.


Tatars were the majority in Crimea and in what is now the south-central mainland of Ukraine until Czarist forces began pushing south in the modern period.  Tatars were decimated by deportation to Siberia and Central Asia by Josef Stalin as punishment for supposed colllaboration with Nazi Germany in the Second World War.  When Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, allowed many deported peoples to return home in the 1950s, Crimean Tatars were not on the list.  But they have trickled backk nonetheless, especially in the post-Soviet period and now make up between 12% and 13% of the Crimean population.  Russians are about 58% and Ukrainians about 24%.  In the Soviet era, Crimea was part of the Russian republic until Khrushchev arbitrarily transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954.

It’s not a good time to be a Tatar.
The Tatar people have, by all accounts, been overwhelmingly against the annexation by Russia, and their leaders are calling for a boycott of the referendum, which the head of the Mejlis (Council) of the Crimean Tatar People, Refat Chubarov, insists will be fixed.  Within Ukraine over the past twenty years, they have enjoyed a privileged status even within Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea—a kind of special dispensation toward indigenous peoples that is antithetical to Putin’s authoritarian and ethnic-chauvinist style.  Tatars have been forming their own “self-defense units,” according to many sources, including both Russian sources, which note it with alarm, and radical Islamist sources, which note it approvingly.  Mustafa Dzhemilev (also spelled Cemil), a revered former chairman of the Mejlis, has even made an explicit call to arms.

Refat Chubarov rails against the Kremlin.
Things could get ugly for the Tatars.  Last week, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported first-hand accounts that ethnic-Russian gangs were drawing up lists of Tatar residents and marking their homes with “X”es.  The right-wing Ukrainian nationalist firebrand Dmitry Yarosh, from the neo-fascist Rightist Sector party, claims that Russians are preparing for a massacre of Crimean Tatars.

Turkey
Moreover, Tatars are looking to Turkey as a possible savior.  It was from the penumbra of the increasingly rickety Ottoman Empire that the Czars seized control of Crimea in the mid 19th century.  Turkey and Russia have been on and off regional rivals—mostly on—since then.  While the United States and western European governments wisely remain wary of getting involved in a ground war with Russia, Tatars are banking that Turkey just might.  Never mind that the slightest retaliatory move by Russia against an interventionist Turkey would trigger Turkey’s mutual-defense agreement as a member of NATO and put Russia on a war footing with three nuclear powers.  That might be a reason for Turkey to shy away from intervening to aid the Tatars; on the other hand, it might embolden them to intervene with impunity: it would be suicidally for Russia to retaliate against Turkey itself.  Still, Crimean Tatars were heartened by the visit to Simferopol, the Crimean capital, on February 28th (reported on at the time in this blog) by Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu.  After the meeting, Dzhemilev described the meeting to reporters, saying, “If a problem arises, Turkey will immediately get involved.”  The speaker of Turkey’s parliament, Cemil Çiçek, spoke in solidarity with Crimean Tatars on March 5th, saying, “Crimea is in our hearts and is a part of our spirit. Our brothers there have suffered more than anyone else in the past century. Our hearts are with our Crimean brothers.”  And Davutoğlu himself has said, “Don’t let it cross your mind that our prime minister and president will be indifferent to any issue affecting our kin in Crimea or anywhere in the world.  Wherever we have brothers in pain we are the first ones to go to help and do whatever we can do.”  Turkey’s 300,000-strong diaspora population of Crimean Tatars have also come out strongly in favor of intervention by Ankara.

A friend in need?  The Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev meeting in Crimea
with Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
The current conflict is also playing into the cold war between two other former republics of the Soviet Union: the predominantly-Christian Republic of Armenia and the predominantly-Muslim Republic of Azerbaijan.  Armenia invaded Azerbaijan after Communism fell and set up the southwestern one-fifth of its territory as an Armenian-populated puppet state called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (N.K.R.), as part of a rivalry with its Turkic-speaking neighbors (including Azeris) dating back to the Anatolian Turks’ anti-Armenian genocide a hundred years ago.  Some Armenian nationalists are hoping that Russia’s new boldness on the Crimean question means Russia might step forward and formally recognize the N.K.R. as an independent state, the way it has done with its own puppet states within the Republic of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Russian irregulars (and possibly regulars as well) fought on the Armenian side in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Armenia is strongly considering joining Putin’s Eurasian Union—his Eastern version of the European Union (E.U.)—the one which Putin tried and failed to bully Ukraine into joining, which is how the whole Crimea conflict began last month.  Azerbaijan, by contrast, is a strong ally of the U.S., which sees it as a crucial staging area for its own cold war against Iran, a Russian ally.  As with Crimea and Russia, the ultimate goal for Armenian nationalists is not so much recognition of N.K.R. sovereignty but annexation to Armenia.


The Azerbaijani government, for its part, is keeping a very low profile during the Crimea crisis, to an extent that has worried and terrified Crimean Tatars.  Dzhemilev appealed to the Azeri leadership last week, saying, “Do not leave your Crimean brothers and sisters at this difficult time.”  But two senior members of Azerbaijan’s opposition party Müsavat (“Equality”) were intercepted by Russian authorities in Makhachkala, the capital of Russia’s adjacent Republic of Dagestan, on March 9th and turned back.  They had been en route to Kiev (Kyiv), the Ukrainian capital, to offer solidarity.

Dzhemilev has also tried in vain to reach out to Kazakhstan as well.  Kazakhs, who are Muslim Turkic-speakers as well, are in a slightly different situation: they are already slated to join Putin’s Eurasian Union.

Where Turkic languages are spoken.  Crimea is in blue.
It’s a big family, but will they be there when needed?
Moldova
Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, many in the Republic of Moldova (formerly the Moldavian S.S.R.), which is dominated by ethnic Romanians, are worried that what is happening in Ukraine may happen next in their country.  They, too, have an ethnic-Russian enclave, Transnistria, a sliver of land along the Ukrainian border, which declared itself independent of Moldova in 1991 and has functioned since then as a de facto independent Russian puppet state outside Moldovan control.  This unresolved territorial dispute has blocked Moldova’s aspirations to reunify with Romania and to join the E.U. and NATO.  If success in Crimea emboldens Putin to occupy, annex, or otherwise stir up trouble in ethnic-Russian parts of the Ukrainian mainland (as speculated upon in detail recently in this blog), then that would include Odessa oblast, to Crimea’s west, which borders Transnistria.  Ideally, Putin would like to link Transnistria by land with Russian territory.  And Moldova is currently gearing up to sign a cooperation agreement with the E.U. similar to the one that was at the root of the current Ukrainian crisis.


A further complication is Moldova’s own Turkic-speaking minority, the Gagauz, who have an autonomous region within Moldova.  Gagauzia’s parliament said last year (as reported at the time in this blog) that they would secede and form an independent state if Moldova made moves toward Romanian reunification.  And in that same February 2014 referendum, 98.4% of Gagauz said they would rather join Putin’s Eurasian Union than the E.U. Maybe they will feel differently if Russia actually invaded Moldova.  Romanians and Moldovans are hoping not to find out.

Does “Welcome to Gagauzia” go for Cossacks too?
Chechens
Probably no Muslim people in the Russian sphere of influence has suffered as much persecution in modern times as the Chechens.  They were on the front lines of Czarist southern expansion in the mid 19th century, their homeland in the Caucasus mountains was a battleground in the Second World War, and after the war Stalin deported hundreds of thousands of them as punishment for supposed collaboration with Nazi Germany.  Perhaps as much as a third of the Chechen nation perished in that wave of executions and deportations.  Caucasus peoples were second-class citizens in the Soviet Union, and after Communism collapsed in 1991 they declared independence.  As many as 50,000 Chechen civilians were killed and their capital leveled in the horrific asymmetrical wars that followed.  Boris Yeltsin and later Putin’s pitiless Chechen bombing campaigns constituted the most brutal in Europe since 1945.


Therefore, the Crimean Tatar people can rely on Chechen support in resisting the Russian invasion, right?  Wrong!  It is one of the oddities of recent Caucasus history that, after Chechnya’s “pacification” and reintegration in the 2000s, Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov as president of the Chechen Republic.  Though the son of the Chechen rebel leader and separatist president, Akhmed Kadyrov, who was assassinated in 2004, the younger Kadyrov had switched sides in the Second Chechen War and become a puppet of Putin.  While the larger Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus has shifted to other republics (see below), Chechnya has become Putin’s loyal fief, where he allows to Kadyrov to run an Islamic-style state without much interference, in exchange for utter loyalty.  In the 2012 presidential elections, Putin won 99.89% of the vote in Chechnya—the highest numbers he got anywhere other than the equally corrupt Caucasus republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (nominally independent but populated mostly by Russian citizens).  If the numbers are true, it is the ugliest manifestation of the Stockholm Syndrome ever recorded.  If they are not, it shows how corrupt and loyal Kadyrov is.  The truth is probably a mixture.

Ramzan Kadyrov (center), current president of the Chechen Republic,
 is not on the side of his fellow Muslims in Crimea.
On February 26th, when Russians in Crimea were just beginning their agitation, Kadyrov announced that his people would be ready to come to the aid of the peninsula’s ethnic Russians.  “Ukraine and Russia are fraternal peoples,” Kadyrov said.  “I have many Ukrainian friends and like them all and regret what has recently been happening there.  The majority of people living today in Crimea are Russians, Cossacks.  We are always with them and if necessary are ready to come to the rescue.  We will stand up for Russians, Cossacks, and Chechens no matter where they live.”  Chechens, he said, were “part of multiethnic and multi-religious Russia” and “are called upon to protect our peoples.  If necessary, we are ready to go, to be observers.  If necessary, we are ready to be peacekeepers and soldiers and protect the people.”

The Chechen capital, Grozny, after Yeltsin and Putin got through with it.
And yet they seem to love Putin there.
Not satisfied with merely cozying to the Tatars’ enemies, Kadyrov threw Tatars under the bus even more explicitly, entreating Tatar deportees and their descendants in Crimea not to “heat up tensions” or “profit from the moment, gather in groups and shout various slogans.”

Ramzan Kadyrov
After the invasion, Kadyrov went further, offering to go there himself.  “If need be,” he said, “I can travel to Ukraine with volunteers who are ready to protect its population.  He added, “I spoke to Tatars, Russians, Cossacks, and Ukrainians, and all of them are saying that there are quite a few people walking in the streets of the Crimean cities, carrying black flags and acting aggressively.  A similar situation sparked the recent events in Kyiv when nationalists started gradually dictating their conditions.   This is why I think all of us need to unite and support Russian President Vladimir Putin in this uneasy situation.”  One wonders if Kadyrov really believes the Russian-media fairy tales of Ukrainian “neo-Nazi” oppression of Crimea’s Russians and Tatars, or whether he is just reading from a script prepared in the Kremlin.

An Orthodox priest demonstrating in Crimea
Caucasus Emirate
But although Chechnya is more or less pacified and under tight Kremlin control, the rest of the Russian-ruled North Caucasus is not.  The republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria especially have been roiled for years by a separatist insurgency called the Caucasus Emirate, which is fueled by a jihadist brand of Sunni Islam that took root in the region—historically home to a more gentle, tolerant Sufist form of Islam—as one of the radicalizing effects of the Chechen Wars.  The “Vilayat Dagestan” cell of the Emirate was behind last year’s deadly bus bombings in Volgograd, which were touted at the time as a preview of the violence to come in the upcoming Winter Olympics in nearby Sochi.  Places like Dagestan are subjected to near-daily violence in the form of assassinations, suicide bombings, and ambushes.  Russian forces just barely govern the area, and the Emirate’s tendrils are intertwined with those of village warlords, organized-crime cartels, and smuggling networks.  The Rightist Sector’s Dmitry Yarosh (see above) recently called on the Caucasus Emirate to join Ukrainian nationalists in the battle against Russia (as reported at the time in this blog).  Whether he really said that and, if he did, whether it was a rhetorical flourish deployed for shock value, one thing is clear: Rightist Sector and the Emirate have almost nothing in common except for hatred of Putin.  But any kind of attack on Tatar rights will be a boon to the recruitment and propaganda efforts of the Emirate and may just drive them to expand their reach into Crimea.  (Crimean Tatars, for the most part, are very moderate in their Islam, with home-grown radicalism almost nonexistent there.)

Does Dmitry Yarosh (left) really want to open Pandora’s Box
by inviting the Caucasus Emirate to Ukraine?
Tatarstan
What of other Muslim peoples in the Russian Federation?  A natural place for beleaguered Tatars to look for help is the Republic of Tatarstan itself, in central Russia near the borderlands of Siberia and Asia.  Tatarstan’s Tatars, sometimes called Volga Tatars, are not the same as Crimean Tatars.  In fact, Tatar has often been a catch-all term for any Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Steppes or Central Asia, and Crimean Tatars are not more necessarily more closely related to the distant Volga Tatars than they are to the closer-by Turkic-speakers in the Caucasus like the Meskhetian Turks or the Karachays and Balkars.  But the Volga Tatars share their Crimean cousins’ history of oppression at Russian hands.  In the Russian civil war that followed the Communist revolution of 1917, Tatars founded the Idel–Ural State, a multinational Menshevik quasi-state which defied the Russian Bolsheviks but ultimately lost.  The Idel–Ural State was not merely Muslim.  Turkic-speaking Tatars and Bashkirs were allied with Christians such as the Turkic-speaking Chuvash and the Finno-Ugrian-speaking Udmurt, Komi, and Mari peoples.  Along with Chechnya, Tatarstan was one of the Russian republics which refused initially to sign on with Boris Yeltsin’s Federation Treaty in 1992; they later capitulated and joined, in exchange for a promise of greater autonomy on which Yeltsin’s successor, Putin, later reneged.


So one might expect Volga Tatars to hold a grudge against Putin.  Volga Tatars might, but their Putin-appointed president, Rustam Minnikhanov, sure doesn’t.  An ethnic Tatar in a republic which is only 53% Tatar, Minnikhanov went to Crimea on March 12th, after the crisis began, to sign a “cooperation agreement” with (wait for it) the self-appointed pro-Kremlin “president” of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov (a former professional boxer with organized-crime links who goes by the nickname “Goblin”).  Minnikhanov also met with local Tatar leaders but spoke as if they were the ones who held the upper hand, lecturing them by saying that he was sure that “Crimean Tatars are smart people who will not let it all end in a bloodbath.”

Tatarstan’s president, Rustan Minnikhanov (right),
visits his kindred in Crimea—but not as an ally.
In recent years, the Caucasus Emirate movement has tried to spread its influence to Tatarstan in particular, even though there is far less home-grown Sunni radicalism there.  But a Putin-appointed president who openly sides against fellow Muslims in the Crimea might just tip the balance and make many Volga Tatars view radical Islam and the Emirate much more sympathetically.  That would be bad news for everyone.  I’m not sure Putin realizes what he’s fooling around with by alienating millions of Muslims living within the Russian Federation.

Serbs
If the Kosovo War has become a subtheme in the diplomatic wrangling over Crimea—with the Kremlin pointing to NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign which paved the way for an independent Kosovo which Russia, a Serbian ally, still opposes—then players in that war have also become a factor.  Among those who have come to Crimea to “defend” the ethnic-Russian population are “Chetnik” mercenaries from Serbia.  These ultranationalist irregulars, named for monarchist radicals from the Second World War era, played a role in the Yugoslav Wars of Succession in the 1990s, battling Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Muslim Albanians in Kosovo.  Now they are in Crimea to do battle opposite the Muslim Tatars who want to stay in Ukraine.  The head of the Chetnik contingent in Crimea, Milutin Mališić, told a press conference in Simferopol, “We represent ‘Chetnik Movement’ organization, you can compare them with the Cossacks in Russia.  Our goal—to provide support on behalf of the Serbian people to the Russian people.  He added, “We came at the invitation of the Cossacks.  During the civil war in Yugoslavia, many Russian volunteers came to support the Serbian people.  We are a small nation and we can not send a large number of people, but we have a great love for the Russian people.”

The Serb militia commander Milutin Mališić holds a press conference in Simferopol.
The Chetnik units in Crimea call themselves “the Wolves.”  They belong to the Chetnik faction headed by Bratislav Živković, which is sometimes called the “Prince Lazar” squadron, named for the Eastern Orthodox saint who battled for Serbia in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and is a revered symbol of Serbian ultranationalism and Islamophobia.  It is not clear how many Chetniks are in Crimea, but Mališić is a veteran of the Kosovo conflict who was also accused in a plot to assassinate the Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian) president, Slobodan Milošević, in 2000.  They are certainly not sanctioned by the Serbian government, which is trying to ingratiate itself with the E.U. nowadays, but if Serbs are killed in Crimea it could complicate matters for Serbia both electorally and diplomatically.

Chetniks newly arrived in Crimea pose with the Chetnik and Serbian flags
and an icon of Prince Lazar.
And Cossacks, the legendary slayers of Muslim infidels in Russian frontier history, are in force in Crimea too—150 officers alone, and an unknown number of rank-and-file fighters.  As Nikolai Pervakov, first deputy commander of the Kuban host of Cossacks, told Time magazine, “Cossacks have no borders.  We are a united people, people of the same faith, traditions, customs.  Our lives are linked.  So we need to be like a clenched and monolithic fist.  Only then will we have victory.”

Cossacks guarding the parliament building in Crimea
But what about some kind of partition of Crimea itself?  If Crimea can secede from Ukraine, can’t a Tatar enclave secede from an independent or Russian Crimea?  The problem, here, is that Tatars live everywhere in the Crimean peninsula.  Plus, Tatars were forced out of their homeland in great numbers by Czarist forces in the 18th and 19th centuries, and deported by Stalin in the 20th.  They’ve been moved enough.  They won’t move again.  They are planning to stand their ground and fight.  What remains to be seen is whether they will have to do so alone.

Members of the Ukrainian feminist political collective Femen
were arrested in a demonstration in Simferopol, Crimea.
[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with a forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  Look for it some time in mid 2014.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.]

Related articles from this blog:
“Donetsk Putsch Nipped in Bud, but Could Odessa or Kharkiv Be Next as Russia Eyes Ukrainian Mainland?” (March 2014)

Sunday, March 2, 2014

Ukraine Loses Grip on Crimea, Prepares for Open War with Russia; Role of Far Right in New Kiev Regime Unclear


The Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine seem to have passed the point of no return and are on the brink of open war this morning (March 2nd) in a conflict that began with a months-long street-politics movement that removed the elected but corrupt and authoritarian pro-Kremlin president last week and is becoming a face-to-face military struggle over Crimea, a predominantly-Russian autonomous region in Ukraine that was part of Russia until 1954.

Duma Gives Putin Green Light for Military Intervention in Ukraine
The Duma, Russia’s parliament, on March 1st resoundingly met President Vladimir Putin’s request for authorization to use military force to intervene in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s acting president, Oleksandr Turchynov, responded by ordering Ukrainian troops, including reservists, to “full combat readiness” and has called the Russian moves “a declaration of war.”


The Ukrainian and United States governments are unequivocal in describing the events in Crimea as a Russian invasion.  The U.S. secretary of state, John Kerry, referred to “the Russian Federation’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory.”  Russia’s prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, denies that such a thing has occurred.

Putin told Ban Ki-Moon, the United Nations secretary general, and the U.S. president, Barack Obama, by telephone on March 2nd that he reserved the right to protect Russian-speakers and Russian interests if things became violent in Ukraine, including Crimea.  In the 90-minute-long conversation, Obama was able to threaten Russia with no more than “costs,” “risks,” and diplomatic isolation.

“Try and stop me” ...

It is hard for the U.S. or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to offer credible warnings, however, since both stood by and did nothing in 2008 when Putin invaded the Republic of Georgia, which was and is, like Ukraine, a NATO “partner” but not one of the full members of the alliance, among whom there is a mutual-defense pact.  In those events, Putin split off and established as “independent” puppet states two separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in an often cited parallel to this week’s events.  Nor can America speak to Putin with much moral authority: the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 in a naked act of aggression on even flimsier pretexts than Russia is using now.  At least the Russian majority in Crimea—unlike Saddam Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction”—actually exist.


An equal amount of doublethink, to be sure, operates in the Kremlin.  In Russia, as per new legislation passed last year (as reported on at the time in this blog), it is illegal to advocate any kind of “separatism.”  To actually enable, let alone advocate, Crimean separatism in Ukraine, one must adopt—as Putin very nearly has—the line that Crimea is not actually part of Ukraine, perhaps that Ukraine itself is actually part of Russia.  (Russia formally, on paper, recognizes Crimea as part of sovereign Ukraine, but it remembers that that is only because Nikita Khrushchev, reputedly while drunk, transferred it from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine with a stroke of the pen in 1954.  It has a Russian ethnic majority and is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.)

“I think I’ll slam back a few more of these and then swap some oblasts around just for shit and giggles."
Despite the precedent of inaction on Georgia, the interim Ukrainian government on March 1st appealed to the NATO with “a request to consider all options to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.”  The North Atlantic Council, which governs NATO, is meeting today (March 2nd) to address the situation.  The Ukrainian parliament has also requested international help in securing their nuclear facilities.  (Like Kazakhstan, Ukraine ended up with some nuclear weapons in its territory after the Soviet Union imploded in 1991.)

Meanwhile, on the ground in Crimea itself ...

Russian Military, Mercenaries Control Crimea
Late last week, unidentified armed Russian-speaking men wearing no insignia took control of the Crimean parliament building and other government offices in Simferopol and also took control of the peninsula’s two major airports, while a Russian naval ship blockaded the harbor.  There was speculation as to the actual identities of these forces; they were clearly not an ad hoc mob, like ones that have been confronting protestors in Ukrainian cities for weeks now.  Some observers describe the occupying force as a military contracting security organization (i.e., mercenaries) operating under the orders of the Russian ministry of the interior, but it is also clear that they are being transported in vehicles bearing the plates of the Russian military associated with the leased military base in Sevastopol where Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is based.  The Ukrainian government says about 6,000 “additional” Russian troops are now in Crimea.

Russian irregulars patrol Crimea’s airports.
Russian authorities in Crimea are reportedly distributing Russian passports to members of the Berkut, the dreaded élite anti-riot police force under the command of the recently ousted pro-Kremlin Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, which the post-Yanukovych interim government has disbanded but which still seems to be involved in keeping order in Crimea.  There are other reports of Russian passports being distributed to ethnic Russians.  This was also a strategy used in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the run-up to the South Ossetia War in 2008.

The dreaded Berkut
In Crimea itself, the pro-Russian president of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, said that he himself was in control of all military and police in Crimea.  He also followed up an earlier promise of a referendum “on Crimea’s status” in May with a new promise for an explicit referendum on independence in only four weeks.  This follows the Crimean parliament’s refusal to recognize the newly installed pro-Western interim government in Kiev.

Sergei Aksyonov says he is now in charge of Crimea.
Local Crimean special forces presumably under Aksyonov’s command, armed with assault rifles, have established checkpoints on all roads connecting Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland and are flying Russian flags there.  According to the latest news reports, hundreds of Russian troops are headed from the leased Russian military bases in Sevastopol and headed to Simferopol, the Crimean capital.  Actual Russian military forces have, according to sources, been looting Ukrainian military facilities on the peninsula of their weapons.

The Crimean parliament building under Russian occupation
Also today (March 2nd) in Simferopol, according to Russian media, members of the Ukrainian military are abandoning their barracks and handing over their weapons to pro-Russian militias.  The Ukrainian ministry of defense denies that any of this is occurring.  To whatever extent it may actually be happening, it may be isolated responses to the reported recent statement by Ukraine’s acting minister of defense, Ihor Tenyuh, in a closed-door parliamentary meeting, to the effect that “Ukraine does not have the military force to resist Russia.”  At the very least, it is confirmed that Ukrainian forces are being ordered not to engage Russian troops directly until so ordered.

And just within the past hour or so, it has been reported that the new admiral in charge of Ukraine’s navy, Denis Berezovsky, who was appointed mere days ago, has pledged his allegiance not to Kiev but to the new pro-Russian regime in Crimea.  In a videotaped statement, he said, “I, Denis Berezovsky Denis, swear allegiance to the Crimean people and pledge to protect them, as required by military regulations.  I swear to take orders of Crimea and Sevastopol’s Supreme Commander” (i.e., Sergei Aksyonov).

Admiral Berezovsky has switched sides.
The Tatar Factor
The indigenous Crimean Tatars, who make up 12% of the peninsula’s population and are Turkic-speaking Muslims, have resolutely sided with the anti-Yanukovych and anti-Russian forces and support the interim government in Kiev.  Tatar leaders, who are guaranteed a certain number of seats in the Crimean parliament, claim that they have been barred from the chamber for the recent pro-Moscow resolutions there.  On February 28th, Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, arrived in Kiev to meet with the chairman of the Mejlis (the mostly toothless “parliament”) of the Crimean Tatar People, Mustafa Abdülcemil.  The Mejlis does not recognize the new emergency governmental structures that Aksyonov has been setting up in Crimea.  This raises worries that Turkey may intervene militarily to defend the Tatars, a kindred ethnic group with deep historical ties, despite the fact that this would bring NATO (of which Turkey is a member) into direct confrontation with Russia.  Turkish government policy, though nominally democratic, is in the de facto control of its “deep state” military complex, which is always poised to stage a coup d’état if Turkish policies are not sufficiently jingoistic.


Role of Far-Rightists in New Ukrainian Government Unclear
The constant description of the new Ukrainian regime in Russian media and in most of the media available in the predominantly-Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine is as “ultranationalists,” “Nazis,” “fascists,” and “Banderists.”  This last term refers to Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian ultranationalist who tried to form an independent Ukrainian state in opposition to Moscow as the Second World War was winding down.  Though he did accept help from Nazi Germany at times, Bandera was ultimately as despised by Adolf Hitler as he was by Josef Stalin, and many of his fellow ultranationalists died in Nazi concentration camps.  When Yanukovych was elected in 2010, the outgoing, anti-Moscow government declared Bandera a “hero of Ukraine,” an official designation that was rescinded after loud international condemnation, including by the European Parliament.  Russian national identity is fiercely bound up with what is considered its greatest moment, Stalin’s defeat of Hitler in what Russians refer to only as “the Great Patriotic War.”  Thus, it is easy to brand those who defy Moscow with anything like the anti-Stalin imagery or iconography of that era as “Nazis.”

Stepan Bandera is still a hero to many Ukrainians.
On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalism is fiercely defined by being anti-Russian, and anyone or anything that defied Stalin is liable to be held up as honorable by the Ukrainian ultranationalist fringe.  Thus, throughout the Euro-Maidan protest movement, the blue-and-yellow national flag of Ukraine has flapped alongside the more grim, swastika-like red-and-black heraldry of pro-fascist organizations that fought Stalin during the Second World War.  For Ukrainian ultranationalists, these flags are “anti-Soviet” and “anti-Russian” rather than “pro-Nazi” or “pro-fascist.”  Or are they?  It is unclear how much of a role far-right groups have played in the Euro-Maidan movement and are playing in the new Euro-Maidan-installed and -vetted Ukrainian interim government.  One thing is certain: these groups have exploded in popularity over the past few months, even if they are still a minority.  It is also difficult to evaluate the situation clearly, because anti-Yanukovych and anti-Putin sources are likely to downplay the role of rightists as they court Western sympathy and pro-Yanukovych and pro-Putin sources are likely to exaggerate it for the opposite reason.

Dmitry Yarosh (left) of the Rightist Sector
One of the more frightening new Ukrainian opposition groups has been the Rightist Sector (Pravy Sektor), whose leader, Dmytro Yarosh, recently called on Doku Umarov, the radical Islamist Chechen leader of the Caucasus Emirate terrorist organization, “to activate his fight” and “take a chance to win” and to take up arms against Russia on the side of Ukraine.  Yarosh pointed out that “many Ukrainians with arms in hand” supported the Chechen Republic’s failed wars of secession from Russia and “it is time to support Ukraine now.”  That kind of statement is unlikely to win the hearts of Western supporters.  Yarosh’s views may or may not be fringe, but his own role is not: he is a deputy secretary—or claims to be one—in Ukraine’s post-Yanukovych National Security and Defense Council (N.S.D.C.) and was prominent on the Euro-Maidan side of the negotiations that led to the transition in power.

Doku Umarov (center)—an ally of Ukraine’s far right?
TheRightist Sector considers itself a successor to Bandera’s “Trident” organization.  In one viral YouTube video, a Rightist Sector activist brandishes an AK-47 and declares, “The Right Sector was armed and will be armed till the time when it will be necessary.  You did not give us this weapon and you will not take it away.  Who wants to take away my machine gun, my pistol, my knives?  Let them try!  As Americans say, ‘God made every man different; Sam Colt made them equal!’  I will put aside my Kalashnikov only when order in Ukraine is restored.”


Other active far-right groups include Patriots of Ukraine, the Social-National Assembly, “Kyiv Organization’s ‘White Hummer,’” and the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO), a right-wing Ukrainian paramilitary founded by veterans of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan.

The Ukrainian far right.  The torches add a nice Transylvanian touch, don’t they?
Pro-Kemlin Mob Raises Russian Flag in Kharkov, Capital of Proposed “Malorossiya”
Pro-Russian rallies were held March 1st, and are ongoing, in various cities across Ukraine, especially ethnic-Russian-dominated ones such as Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, and especially Kharkov and Donetsk. Donetsk is the capital of Yanukovych’s home oblast (province), where ethnic Ukrainians have only a tiny majority; Yanukovych is of mixed Polish, Belarussian, and Russian parentage.  Kharkov was the capital of the nascent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the Russian Civil War in the late 1910s, when it allied itself against anti-Moscow republics formed in Kiev and other areas in western Ukraine.  It is the proposed capital of the separate republic of Malorossiya (“Little Russia”) that some Russian nationalists would like to establish in eastern and southern Ukraine (as discussed recently in this blog).  Kharkov was also Yanukovych’s first stop when he fled Kiev after his impeachment.

The scene in Donetsk this weekend
Andry Parubij, Ukraine’s new acting secretary of defense, says that the country’s N.D.S.C. (see above) has foiled attempts by foreign forces to foment uprisings in other oblasts of Ukraine similar to the one that has played out in Crimea.  At least one western oblast, Transcarpathia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, tried to secede in 2008 on behalf of its Ruthenian and Hungarian ethnic minorities.  Ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia seem at least to be siding against the new government in Kiev.


Ukrainian founder of Femen seeks asylum in Switzerland
Anna Hutsol, the leader of the Ukrainian feminist guerilla-politics collective Femen, confirmed on March 1st that she was seeking political asylum in Switzerland.  The group, which has aligned itself with the dissident Russian punk band Pussy Riot and takes an aggressive anti-clerical, anti-puritanical, anti-patriarchal, and anti-Moscow stand.  Femen has also made some enemies among the opposition by siding resolutely against the until-recently-imprisoned opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko, who was a hero of Ukraine’s pro-Western “Orange Revolution” of 2004 but who is regarded as corrupt as well.  During the Euro-Maidan movement, Femen has been based in Paris, but has run afoul of France’s laws against blasphemy and causing “offense,” which are nearly as harsh and arbitrary as Russia’s, though they tend not to be enforced by Cossacks with whips.  Hutsol has a sister who lives in Winterthur, in the canton of Zurich, but due to the fact that her visa is for France she may have to seek asylum there instead.  Hutsol said that it is too risky for her and her fellow activists to return to Ukraine.



[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with a forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas.  Look for it some time in 2014.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.]



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