Thursday, October 23, 2014

Miamians, Fed Up with GOP Indifference to Rising Seas, Propose “State of South Florida”


The contested United States presidential election in 2000 between Al Gore and George W. Bush made Florida famous not only for ballot-box dysfunction but also for its division on a razor’s edge between Republican and Democratic halves, mirroring the country as a whole.  A point of debate between the candidates had been climate change, which Gore, along with most educated and intelligent people, saw as a real threat and which Bush’s supporters scorned—as most Republicans still do—as a scare story in service to a liberal plot to overregulate industry.  That same divide was seized upon this month by Democratic leaders in South Miami, including its mayor, as a primary reason that the southern half of the state should split away as the “State of South Florida.”

Also check out U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3.
Another high-ranking supporter of partition, Vice-Mayor Walter Harris put it, “We have to be able to deal directly with this environmental concern and we can’t really get it done in Tallahassee.  I don’t care what people think; it’s not a matter of electing the right people.”  And Robert Welsh, a city commissioner, said, “The only time you get real cooperation from a government is when you threaten them with action.”  Mayor Philip Stoddard, a former professor of biology, added, “Our representatives aren’t paying attention to the scientists.  It seems a bit quixotic, but I have been advocating separation for 15 years.”  Mayor Stoddard on October 7th signed the (very non-binding) resolution on statehood, after the municipal commissio it with a 3-to-2 vote.

Miami?  Hm, maybe we’ll vacation in Denver this winter.
The proposed 51st state would include 24 counties and have a capital, according to Harris, somewhere in Orange County, near Kissimmee.  The area would include the Everglades, the Florida Keys (home to the self-declared independent Conch Republic, but that’s another story), and the larger Miami metropolitan area and reach just far enough north to take in Orlando and Tampa as well.  The 24 counties make up about 39% of Florida’s land and, with 13.5 million people, constitute two-thirds of the state population.

Key West’s self-declared Conch Republic would be part of
the State of South Florida under the new plan.
Typically, 51st-state movements—not counting those of overseas territories like Puerto Rico, Guam, and American Samoa—have a partisan dimension and in particular tend to be spearheaded by voting blocs whose minority status in an existing state effectively shut them out of not only gubernatorial elections but also indeed national politics under the non-proportional, first-past-the-post system that sends representatives to the Senate as well as to the Electoral College that elects the president.  Thus, California Republicans in that state’s rural far north (“State of Jefferson”—sometimes taking in part of Oregon as well) and far south (“South California”) would like to split away to escape domination by California’s Democratic majority.  Likewise for statehood movements in the “red” fringes of other “blue” states—examples including “Western Maryland,” “West New York,” and movements by downstate Republicans to expel Chicago from Illinois and upstate conservatives in Nevada to draw a state boundary between themselves and Las Vegas.  (Since Republicans would retain the state capital, these are more properly expulsion, rather than secession, movements.)


Less numerous are blue statehood movements in red states, the most prominent of which is a push for a “State of Baja Arizona” centered on liberal Tucson.  But none of any of these proposals has any chance of success.  After all, U.S. Congress has to approve any new admissions to the union, even those (like Maine and West Virginia, historically) which join through secession.  The U.S. political system encourages closely divided legislatures, and therefore the necessary consensus to admit a new state usually occurs only when two states, one for each moiety of the political spectrum of the day, can be admitted in tandem.  That pattern was inaugurated with the Missouri Compromise of 1820, in which the slave state of Missouri and the free state of Maine were created nearly simultaneously, and continued right up to the admission of Democratic-dominated Hawaii and Republican-dominated Alaska in 1959.  Creating a State of Jefferson would guarantee two new Republican senators on Capitol Hill, while leaving the Democratic hold on what remained of California unchanged, and Democrats would never go for that; likewise with Republican attitudes toward any talk of Baja Arizona.

Elements in this proposed Baja Arizona flag seem designed to irk Republicans:
a French tricolore, and a saguarro cactus that looks a lot like a raised middle finger.
So it is only in swing states that there is any chance of adding a 51st star to the flag.  A premier example was last year’s “State of North Colorado” movement, in which rural conservative counties in Colorado’s Front Range region pushed for secession.  It was a reaction not only to the formerly solidly Republican state’s becoming more and more Democratic as cities grow and Latino immigration increases but also to its tipping far into the social-issues vanguard by decriminalizing marijuana.  But Colorado’s demographics and political future are still ambiguous enough that no one in Washington is willing to risk dividing it; the status quo is a better bet.  (For one thing, no one’s sure how many Hispanic voters will remain Democratic after Obamamania subsides.)  Another example of a statehood movement in a swing state is a long-standing movement in Michigan’s remote, conservative Upper Peninsula to become the “State of Superior.”  (Some Superior proposals include the northern fringes of the Lower Peninsula and the northern edges of Wisconsin—another swing state—and mostly-liberal Minnesota as well.)  A recent proposal from the Pittsburgh suburbs to hive off western Pennsylvania as the “State of Westania” is less partisan in motivation: each resulting half would contain one of Pennsylvania’s large liberal cities (Philadelphia would dominate the rump eastern Pennsylvania) and thus both would likely still be swing states.

The blue counties voted to stay in Colorado in the 2013 non-binding referenda;
the orange ones opted to become the State of North Colorado.
But a South Florida proposal may just give Republican and Democratic leaders pause.  After all, every four years each party spends enormous amounts of time and money courting votes in Florida to tip that most populous of swing states, and the most closely divided one, into one column or the other.  Presidential candidates would be delighted to be able to skip the “safe” states of North Florida and South Florida and concentrate campaigns on a smaller number of mostly contiguous key swing states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

Some Tea Partiers want to found a red state in the North Woods
of Michigan and Wisconsin.
Demographically, Florida is an odd mix: part of the Deep South historically, the southern part of the state has received large numbers of retirees from the liberal north, and especially northeast (remember those thousands of Palm Beach Jews in 2000 who apparently accidentally voted for the rabidly xenophobic third-party nut-job Pat Buchanan?), while the presence of world-class beaches and Orlando’s Disney World has made South Florida seem at times like a colonial outpost of California.  Some South Floridians don’t even talk funny.  Cuban-Americans, arriving in a flood after the Communist revolution of 1959, are most of the state’s 18% Hispanic share and an influential force in state politics; traditionally, they have been the only reliably Republican-voting Latino population in the U.S., since Republicans have always done a better job of portraying themselves as aggressive opponents of Communism (especially after John F. Kennedy bungled the Bay of Pigs invasion).  But with the Cold War over, state socialism looking set to slide gently into Chinese-style economic liberalization as Fidel Castro fades away, and a younger generation feeling more American than Cuban, Cuban-Americans, who are concentrated in and around Miami, are becoming more Democratic.

Ah, I’m getting all nostalgic for fin-de-siècle America!
Even among whites, the Democratic–Republican divide does not pattern neatly into one horizontal line across the neck of Florida.  Partisan differences, as elsewhere, largely follow an urban–rural split (the conservative city of Jacksonville being an exception), and, though South Florida has Miami, Tampa, Orlando, and other large cities, there are liberal pockets in the north and conservative pockets in the south as well (see map below).  It’s possible that even Republicans in the south could eventually be brought around to consider the scientific consensus on climate change plausible.  A couple inches of water would probably do it.  After all, even Republicans in Alaska are aware—the polar regions being a kind of canary in the mines where climate change is having the most dramatic effect—that global warming is real.


And South Florida is a very low-lying peninsula.  Huge parts of it, including nearly all the southern counties that include the Everglades and greater Miami, would be underwater if sea levels rose by, say, 5 to 10 meters (see map below).  No one’s predicting a 10-meter rise any time soon, but even a rise of a couple feet would destroy the Everglades and maybe prompt the abandonment of Miami—a city less easy to fortify with levees than, say, New Orleans or the coastal cities of the Netherlands.  It puts one in mind of the post-deluvian near-future southern Louisiana depicted in the fanciful 2012 film Beasts of the Southern Wild.  It made a good movie, but life there wasn’t pretty.


The South Florida movement, then, may just be the first secessionist movement motivated mostly by fears of climate change.  But a five-meter rise would change the political stakes beyond just the Sunshine State.  All of coastal Louisiana would vanish, prompting a more wholesale version of what happened after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, when somewhat purplish but still mostly “red” (Republican) Louisiana ended up a more solid bright red after thousands of Democratic-leaning coastal populations like African-Americans, Cajuns, and urban middle-class whites fled the state for good.


As the map below shows, rising sea levels could also have effects that include disrupting democratic and economic reforms in Cuba—possibly prompting a new exodus to (what’s left of) Florida—and chaos in the Yucatan Peninsula, a region of Mexico dominated by Mayan Indians, a group which spearheaded the Zapatista anti-globalization uprising in Chiapas and elsewhere in 1994.  Oh, and one more thing: could Orlando or Atlanta or someplace please find room for the entire population of the Bahamas?


Rising sea levels in the southern Caribbean would bring disruptions to Venezuela’s oil industry and turn politics upside-down there, including anti-socialist (and to an extent C.I.A.-stoked) rebellions in the westernmost and most oil-rich state, Zulia.  French Guiana’s coastline would be swallowed up, raising the question of whether France will want to give up that lucrative colony, currently the largest remaining overseas territory of a European country other than Greenland (which, incidentally, by this time would be independent and richer than Kuwait due to suddenly accessible energy resources in the ice-free Arctic Ocean).


Turning to northern Europe (see below), among the cultures which might vanish if sea levels rose is the nation of Frisia, concentrated mostly in the Netherlands but also including parts of Denmark and Germany.  The Dutch could protect part of their territory from the sea, but not all of it.  (This could bring normally dormant interethnic tensions into relief—and we don’t even need to mention Belgium, where most of the land swallowed up would be low-lying Flanders.)  And London, if it survives, will have to be a below-sea-level city like New Orleans, constantly worried about floods and the strength of its levees.  Avoiding that stress by decamping to Brighton for the weekend will seem a less attractive option after the Gulf Stream diverts away, so maybe it’s time for a holiday in Florida—oh, no, wait, never mind.


Southern Europe would be in better shape.  If the European Union, Israel, Turkey, and the Arab League pooled their resources, they could easily install locks at the Strait of Gibraltar and keep the Mediterranean Sea at any level they want, thus saving cities like Istanbul, Venice, Barcelona, and Alexandria from inundation.  Suddenly, southern Europe would be the rich part of the E.U., with flood-ravaged countries like Germany and Denmark going cap-in-hand to the high-and-dry booming economies of Greece and Italy.)

The Pillars of Hercules: nec plus ultra except lots and lots of water.
Indonesia, always kept on a boil by ethnic strife, would be tested to its limit.  Though it has oil, it will have to perform a bit of triage to decide which regions to help the most.  Riau and other wealthy ethnic-Malayan/Indonesian areas on Sumatra along the Strait of Malacca, near Singapore, will likely get lots of economic aid and structural assistance, but expect the tribal peoples of Papua, West Papua, and Kalimantan (Borneo) to get the shitty end of the stick as usual and maybe rise up in protest.  Oh, and that South Moluccas government-in-exile in the Netherlands? It won’t be a government-in-exile anymore, but only because nearly all the residents of those now submerged islands will have to relocate to Amsterdam permanently.)


Perhaps worst off will be Bangladesh.  With more than half the U.S.’s population packed into a region of fragile deltas and sandbars the size of Wisconsin, and millions living on the brink of survival anyway, this poorest of the poor among major nations could become a demographic Cheronobyl in the middle of Asia.  Already, the bloody war of independence from Pakistan in 1971 and hopeless miring in poverty and coastal erosion since then have created an exodus of Bengali Muslims into neighboring countries.  In nearby parts of India, Hindu and Christian ethnic militias have long been itching to expel Bengalis from their territories, and in Burma (Myanmar) Buddhist-led pogroms against the Rohingya people—800,000 stateless Muslims marginalized by the state as “Bangladeshi squatters”—has derailed the ruling junta’s attempt to liberalize and present itself to the world as a responsible global citizen.  Imagine what it would do to Burma and India if, instead of tens or hundreds of thousands of displaced Bangladeshis, they would be asked to absorb, oh, say, 70 million of them.  Especially since Burma would be losing much of its coastline too.


Though their population is dwarfed by the countries listed above, it is possibly the minuscule nations consisting mainly of low-lying islands that have the most to fear from rising sea levels.  The Bahamas in the Caribbean (see above); Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu in the South Pacific; and the Seychelles and Maldives in the Indian Ocean are among those nations which could disappear altogether if the seas rose more than a little bit.  The highest Maldivean point of land is seven feet above sea level, and for several terrifying minutes during the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 the entire Republic of the Maldives was underwater.  If a situation like that became permanent, not only would there have to be material provisions made for the survival of such populations, but a whole rethinking of the idea of nation might have to take place.  Hundreds of local cultures could become like the sovereign but landless Military Order of the Knights of Malta, or like the Roma (Gypsy) people, or, in a closer analogy, like the Chagossians—the native people of Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory who were deported by the British and Americans in the late 1960s and early ’70s to make way for NATO bases and who now live mostly in the village of Crawley, in County Sussex, England, dreaming of home and trying to keep their culture and dignity together.  (See a recent article from this blog on the Chagossians.)

The Chagossian nation has a flag but no place to plant it.
Could Kiribatians and Seychellois one day be—pardon the expression—in the same boat?
The people of Miami don’t want to end up like that.  But the state’s Republican governor and industry-bought-out power-brokers (of both parties, incidentally) will not help them prepare for coming changes.  As Mayor Stoddard told a reporter, “It’s very apparent that the attitude of the northern part of the state is that they would just love to saw the state in half and just let us float off into the Caribbean.”  I guess North Florida should be careful what it wishes for: if South Florida secedes, it will take most of Florida’s economy with it.

“It’s a small world after all” ... you know, especially the land part of it
[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with my forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  (That is shorter than the previous working title.)  The book, which contains dozens of maps and over 500 flags, is nearly ready for the printer and should be on shelves, and available on Amazon, by February 2015.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even though you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this special announcement for more information on the book.]

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Malawians Debate Hiving Off North of Already-Tiny Country to Form “Nyika Republic”


The number of African countries which do not have an active separatist movement has shrunk by one more, as the Republic of Malawi, a remarkably slender sliver of land wedged between Mozambique and Zimbabwe in southern Africa, is having its unity challenged by a separatist movement in its Northern Region.


In May of this year, the Progressive Democratic Party (P.D.P.) was voted in to replace the People’s Party (P.P.), whose charismatic president, Joyce Banda, a champion of women’s rights, was more popular internationally than at home.  (Only Africa’s second female president ever, she was also a champion of gay rights.)  The new president, Peter Mutharika, a Yale-educated lawyer and diplomat and brother of a former president, has angered P.P. supporters by stuffing 80% of his cabinet with fellow residents of Malawi’s Southern Region.  Banda had been vice-president under Mutharika’s brother, Bingu wa Mutharika, until she succeeded him upon his death in 2012.  Though also a southerner, Banda’s constituency was a big tent and she worked hard not to show preference for one region over another.  Her succession to the post was assailed since she had become a critic of the first President Mutharika’s policies.

Joyce Banda
The governer of Malawi’s Northern Province, the Rev. Christopher Nzomera Ngwira, has now proposed breaking the northern region off as a separate “Nyika Republic.”  Ngwira (shown on the left in the photo at the top of this article) is from the P.P., which Banda had founded.  The Malawi Congress Party, which is now the main opposition party, is calling instead for a federal system in which each of the three administrative regions will have considerably enhanced powers—a position to which the current President Mutharika’s party has in recent weeks had to pay serious attention.

Map showing hotbeds of separatist sentiment in Malawi’s north
The president of the Peoples Transportation Party (PETRA) and Lucius Banda (no relation to Joyce), a traditional African musician and former political prisoner who now leads the United Democratic Front’s parliamentary delegation, have both called for a referendum to decide the matter.


Federalism is a controversial topic in Malawi.  Under British rule, Malawi, then known as Nyasaland, was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a vast macro-colony sprawling across southern Africa’s interior whose touted “federalism” was a cruel joke that belied the injustices of apartheid.  Thus, Malawi’s first president and hero of the independence movement, Hastings Kamuzu Banda (once again, no relation), a U.S.-educated physician, in 1964 organized the fledgling Republic of Malawi as a strong unitary state.  Thus the country’s three administrative regions are blandly named the Northern, Southern, and Central regions.  Banda was a member of the Chewa ethnic group which forms 90% of the population of Central Region; Chewas are the largest ethnic group in Malawi, about a third of its total population.  (Fun fact: when Banda was at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and ’30s, he studied history but also got to know prominent anthropologists like Edward Sapir and collaborated with the legendary folklorist Stith Thompson on recording Chewa traditions.  When I studied anthropology at the University of Chicago in the 1990s, a huge number of ethnological works on Africa in the university library bore book-plates announcing their donation by “President for Life” Hastings Banda.  Therefore I owe him something of an intellectual debt, though the wealth that paid for those books was pillaged from the Malawian people under his party dictatorship.  Dr. Banda’s regime was cosy with apartheid-era South Africa and murdered perhaps as many as 18,000 political opponents.)

Hastings Kamuzu Banda and the Prince of Wales during a state visit in 1972
Malawian politics have been tumultuous since Hastings Banda’s removal in 1994 ushered in a belated crash course in multi-party democracy on the part of the Malawian people.  There seems to be an emerging, and also long-overdue, consensus that politics should be less centralized.  Whether this can be done before Northern Region secessionists became frustrated enough to push for separation more aggressively remains to be seen.  We will keep readers posted.

The Malawian flag introduced by the first President Mutharika in 2010.
It replaced an earlier version showing only the top half of the sun;
some had pointed out that that one could be interpreted as a setting sun just as well as a rising one.
[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with my forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  (That is shorter than the previous working title.)  The book, which contains dozens of maps and over 500 flags, is nearly ready for the printer and should be on shelves, and available on Amazon, by February 2015.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even though you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this special announcement for more information on the book.]


Two heads-of-state-for-life inspect Malawian troops in 1972.

Wednesday, September 17, 2014

What Is and Isn’t at Stake in Scotland: Cameron’s Warnings vs. What Would Actually Happen after a “Yes” Vote


In his last-ditch efforts to prevent Scotland from voting “yes” on independence tomorrow (September 18th), the United Kingdom’s prime minister, David Cameron, has shifted away from the tones of condescension which have in the past proved to make Scots bristle and become even more determinedly separatist.  Instead, he has veered from maudlin nostalgia—saying he would be “heartbroken” if the U.K. were sundered, as though the hurt feewings of the leader of the Conservative Party ever entered into the considerations of nationalistic Scots—to, mostly, dire warnings.  But those warnings at best misleading, and at worst disingenuous.


“If you don’t like me,” Cameron said yesterday, addressing himself to Scottish nationalists who are overwhelmingly way to the left of him, and of England, “I won’t be here forever.  If you don’t like this government, it won’t last forever.  But if you leave the U.K., that will be forever.”  He added, “It is my duty to be clear about the likely consequences of a yes vote.  Independence would not be a trial separation.  It would be a painful divorce.”


But like all divorces, it would be a process.  When a husband and wife, sitting around the kitchen table, decide to call it splits, then half the furniture in the house doesn’t magically vanish, and their savings account does not magically subdivide.  What begins is a months- or years-long process of paperwork, negotiation, and implementation—and post-nuptial arrangements that it is for the two of them to agree upon.  So it will be with Scotland and the U.K. starting tomorrow if Scots vote “yes”—which, polls indicate, they are about as likely to do as not.  The Union Jacks would be lowered and the St. Andrew’s saltires raised, but that’s about all that would change on September 19th.  Possibly, that’s all that would change for months.  A process of negotiation would begin.  And any number of things could be negotiated—negotiated by Scots, not decided for them.


In particular, Cameron has warned about the consequences of being suddenly left outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), outside the European Union (E.U.), and without the British pound.  We can take each of these in turn.

Europe’s NATO member states and when they joined
Scotland sits atop the British archipelago surrounded by the North Sea, across the water from NATO states like Norway and Iceland.  A Scottish exit from NATO would have pretty much no effect on its own security, the rump U.K.’s, or anyone else’s.  No one thinks that the Republic of Ireland is especially vulnerable to foreign invasion because it is not in NATO, or that Ireland’s non-membership makes the U.K. more vulnerable.  The main effect of a Scotland outside NATO would be that young Scottish men and women will not die for nothing in the next quagmire in Afghanistan or Iraq the way they have in the past.  And besides, most Scots would like to stay in NATO, but without keeping Trident nuclear submarines in their waters.  The nukes’ relocation would have to be negotiated and then implemented, but that is not an obstacle to anything; arms are moved around all the time, and this also needn’t happen immediately.  To negotiate staying in, that’s up to NATO, and if other members wanted an independent Scotland to stay in NATO—and why wouldn’t they?—then a simple vote could mean a smooth transition, with the benefit to Scots of a guaranteed Scottish voice in the war room.  Everyone wants more or less the same thing here, and NATO’s membership rules are nowhere near as complicated as the E.U.’s, which is the real bogeyman Cameron has been threatening with Scots with ...


Despite the promises by Alex Salmond, Scotland’s separatist First Minister (chief executive), that Scotland could stay in the E.U. and Cameron’s threats that it couldn’t, no one is 100% sure what would happen.  Processes for E.U. accession are complex and time-consuming, and no one is even certain if this would be a case of accession.  It might be one of succession.  But there has never been a federal member-state dissolved within the E.U. before; there are no provisions for it.  When the Soviet Union vanished in 1991, its fifteen constituent republics swiftly gained United Nations seats as soon as they were internationally recognized—not just the Baltic States, whose annexation the U.N. had never recognized anyway, or Ukraine and Belarus, who had token U.N. seats already, but all of them.  When Czechoslovakia became the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in 1994, two new U.N. member states blipped into existence as Czechoslavakia blipped out; no one had to apply.  Now, the U.N. is not the E.U., and things wouldn’t go quite that smoothly with the E.U., but they might go nearly as smoothly once the details had been agreed upon.  First, legal experts would have to sort out the legal implications of thousands of pages of rules which do not address the issue directly, and, second, there would have to be a search for consensus within the E.U. as to whether Scotland should be allowed to stay in.  (See an article from this blog discussing the accession-vs.-succession issue in more detail.)

The European Union
In fact, Scotland could conceivably use the argument that if an independent Scotland had to reapply for E.U. membership, so would the other new, unprecedented state coming into existence simultaneously: the Sort of United Kingdom of England and Bits of Ireland Plus Wales or Something of the Sort.  The U.K. came into existence in the first place as the equal merger of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland.  So why shouldn’t international organizations be required to treat the two resulting pieces of that sundered union equally?  A strong case could be made.


Setting that aside, in the case Scotland had to reapply for membership, would the rump U.K. and the rest of the E.U. accept it?  The “no” camp makes it sound now as though that is far from guaranteed.  But once independence were a reality, would it be in Cameron’s interest, or anyone’s, to ensure Scotland’s exile from the E.U. just to make some point, or to punish Scots?  No; trade barriers between Scotland and England would hurt the English too, if not quite as much as it would the Scots.  The U.K. public and the U.K. political establishment would be unanimous in wanting Scotland to stay in the E.U.  Negotiating stubbornly and vindictively with Edinburgh would not be in any U.K. prime minister’s interest, on this or any other issue.


What about the rest of the E.U.?  The biggest sticking point might be the government of Spain, which has repeatedly indicated that it would veto the membership application of an independent Scotland—possibly in some kind of a pact with the U.K. government, in exchange for a U.K. veto of an application by a potentially independent Catalonia in the future.  But an E.U. vote on Scottish membership would not happen until well after Catalonia’s November 2014 referendum on independence, and may not even happen the next year or the one after that—by which time Scotland would probably still be in the E.U. while it negotiated the mechanics of its separation from the U.K.  Soon enough we will know better how the Catalan secession movement is to play out, and the situation of Catalonia is very different.  For one thing, the Spanish government has forbidden Catalonia to hold its referendum in November, and Catalonia seems set to defy Madrid and hold it anyway.  Not only will it not be a binding referendum, but it will be an “illegal” one.  Even if the Scottish case created a precedent for succession to membership, rather than accession, of secessionist states within the E.U., it would certainly be a precedent that included the consent of the parent state among its firm requirements.  Spain, if it decided to remain bloody-minded and undemocratic in its approach to Catalan national aspirations, would have nothing to fear from Scottish membership in the E.U. and could accomplish nothing by blocking it.  It knows this already, and its threat of a mutual-veto pact is a posture intended to frighten Catalans and to frighten Scots from “encouraging” them.  And the same goes for other E.U. member states with separatist regions—Italy with Padania, Germany with Bavaria, etc.  (Belgium is a special case; its dissolution is inevitable, and no one will let Brussels itself fall outside the E.U.)


Plus: will the U.K. even stay in the E.U.?  Cameron never brings this up on his trips to Edinburgh, but the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has already pressured the Conservative Party into promising a referendum on E.U. membership if it is reelected.  Even with left-leaning, pro-Brussels Scotland in the U.K., no one can be 100% sure how such a vote would go, and the far more right-wing and Euroskeptic country a Scotland-less U.K. would become would be if anything more inclined to leave the E.U.  It would be reasonable for a Scot to feel that leaving the U.K., far from being a guaranteed exile from the E.U., would be the best way to ensure keeping E.U. membership.  After all, if Scotland voted “no” and then the U.K. voted to leave the E.U., Scots would be utterly powerless to prevent it.  Utterly.  See, that’s where it sometimes helps to be—what is that word again?—independent.


These arguments about staying in the E.U. also, if you will pardon the term, scotch the “no” camp’s warnings of how poor a country Scotland would be if independent.  Scots are warned that all that North Sea oil and natural gas will eventually run out.  What the unionists are not mentioning is that, if Scotland stays in the U.K., then it is the U.K.’s oil and natural gas that will run out—and no one seems horrifically worried about the effects of that.  Nor is Norway, which has a comparable share of the same resource-rich North Sea, debating whether or not it should ask to become a colony of Denmark again as a hedge against the oil running out.  In sum, things like non-renewable resources running out is one reason it makes sense to stay in a trade union like the E.U.—or, like Norway, to have a special trading pact with one.  Independent or not, everyone will want Scotland’s economy to remain embedded in Europe’s and the world’s and to be diverse and not non-resource-extraction-dependent—and it will be. (See an article from this blog discussing different aspects of Scotland’s oil question.)


But what about the pound?  Cameron and the “no” camp have stated repeatedly that Scotland may not keep the pound.  In point of fact, it may not be for the U.K. to say.  Pound notes are minted by the Bank of England and by the Bank of Scotland, both of them institutions which date to well before the merger of the two kingdoms as the U.K. more than 300 years ago.  The political and legal process that would follow a “yes” vote tomorrow may well determine that Scotland has as much a right to keep printing them as England does.  And even if it doesn’t, then the U.K. could, with one vote in Parliament, extend to Scotland that privilege, and—as is the case with trade barriers mentioned above vis-à-vis the E.U.—everyone would benefit from Scotland and the rest of the U.K. having a shared currency and thus everyone could and would work together to ensure it.  And even if a rump-U.K. government were politically pressured to shoot itself and its people in the foot (feet?) economically by denying Scotland the right to use the pound, nothing could stop them.  Ecuador, after all, uses the United States dollar as its currency.  It need not ask the U.S. for permission to do so, and Washington need not grant it.  If a country has the coins and notes, it can use them.  Furthermore, at the end of the inevitable long transition period a “yes” vote would set in motion, Scots might decide—no one else could decide this for them, only Scots—to join the Euro Zone or to establish their own currency, pegged to another currency to whatever extent they might like.  There is ample time to do this.  Cameron’s warnings on currency are not so much tilting the arguments in one direction; they are lies.


In sum, independence can mean a lot of different things, none of which has been fully specified.  For example, three states—the Isle of Man and the two Channel Islands, Jersey and Guernsey—are not part of the U.K. but are instead Crown Dependencies.  Queen Elizabeth II is their sovereign, just as she is of far-flung, fully independent states like Jamaica and Papua New Guinea, but the three are 100% self-governing save for the areas of currency and defense.  (Newfoundland once held this status as well.)  Man and the Channel Islands are actually more independent of the U.K., in some ways, than any two E.U. member states are from each other.  In fact, the three island nations lie outside the E.U., but only because they—like Denmark’s Greenland and the Faroe Islands and some other European overseas possessions—chose to when the U.K. joined in 1973.  They could as well have chosen to be in it—perhaps with special exemptions from rules, such as those Finland’s self-governing Åland territory negotiated for itself when its parent country joined—and it would have been their decision, not London’s.  (As it happens, they like being offshore tax havens.)  In legal terms, Man and the Channel Islands are three independent states in free association with the U.K., exactly the same status held by Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, which are states in free association with their former colonial master, the U.S., and which have their own U.N. seats—as Man and the Channel Islands could too if they ever decided to bother with it.  (The same goes for New Zealand’s two “free association” states, the Cook Islands and Niue.)  If London and Edinburgh decided that it was the best solution, Scotland could become a Crown Dependency, though for psychological reasons Scots might opt for more accurate terminology, like “Independent Commonwealth Realm in Free Association.”  Or it could choose a slightly greater or lesser degree of independence in any number of ways—for example, with a currency deal or without, with a defense pact or customs union of any sort the two states wished to negotiate, etc. etc.

The flag of the Isle of Man
Cameron promises Scots that if they vote “no” tomorrow, they are still on track to receive more devolution and more rights and concessions in the months and years to come which will come close to independence already.  Quite so.  But the converse is also true: a “yes” vote will mean as many of the trappings and benefits of union as Scotland and the U.K. agree are in order, and when it comes to those details Scots and (other?) Britons will find after a “yes” vote that they mostly want the same things.  The difference will be that after a “no” vote those decisions would be made top-down from London while after a “yes” vote they would be negotiated between equals.  Tomorrow, Scots will decide which sounds better.



[For those who are wondering, yes, this blog is tied in with my forthcoming book, a sort of encyclopedic atlas to be published by Auslander and Fox under the title Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.  (That is shorter than the previous working title.)  The book, which contains dozens of maps and over 500 flags, is nearly ready for the printer and should be on shelves, and available on Amazon, by February 2015.  I will be keeping readers posted of further publication news.  Meanwhile, please “like” the book (even though you haven’t read it yet) on Facebook and see this special announcement for more information on the book.]


Tuesday, September 16, 2014

Special Announcement


Readers of the Springtime of Nations blog know that the next few weeks are a crucial time for our topic, that of ethnonationalism and new-state movements.  A referendum in Scotland the day after tomorrow challenges the seventy-year-old political order in Europe and may sunder the United Kingdom—the progenitor, by some measures, of the modern nation-state (or nations-state, if you will).  Meanwhile, an anti-nationalist caliphate with global ambitions called Islamic State has established itself in the heart of the Middle East, threatening to draw world powers into a gigantic, unending conflict.  And Western hegemony is being challenged from another direction as well, as the fate of a cease-fire in Ukraine between pro-Western and pro-Eastern forces will determine whether Russia’s ambition to rebuild the territory of the Soviet Union and restore itself as a superpower to rival the United States will be curbed or energized.


Meanwhile, the articles in this blog have slowed to a trickle of late.  Partly this is because (or at least I tell myself this) the kind of news readers used to have to read this blog to find are now the world headlines, day after day.  (And long-time readers will recall that Springtime of Nations knew that ISIS / Islamic State, Scottish devolution, and the patchy demographics of the Soviet successor states were crises-in-the-making long before the mainstream media acknowledged it.)


But the main reason is my forthcoming book—Let’s Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements, Independence Struggles, Breakaway Republics, Rebel Provinces, Pseudostates, Puppet States, Tribal Fiefdoms, Micronations, and Do-It-Yourself Countries, from Chiapas to Chechnya and Tibet to Texas—which is right now in the final stages of production.  Galleys have been corrected, and the final composition of the pages is nearly done.  The book, which will be published by Auslander and Fox, is over 500 pages long and contains over 35 maps and over 500 flags—flag images, rather—and if there is a more complete guide to separatist movements in print anywhere, to see nothing of one packaged so accessibly and usefully, then I don’t know about it, and I’ve looked.


Once Let’s Split! is out of my hands, which I trust will be in the next month or so, I will return to blogging more regularly, and I will also take time out to offer some general observations on the Scottish referendum before long as well.


Meanwhile, please “like” and “follow” the Let’s Split! page on Facebook, where I regularly post news, observations, and other entertaining and informative links on separatist and ethnonationalist movements—some of which will eventually be developed into articles for this blog.


Both this blog and the Let’s Split! Facebook page are places where readers will find updates on the publication of the book, now scheduled to hit the shelves—knock on wood—in time to stuff the stockings of the regional activist, tinfoil-hat-wearing “sovereign citizen,” separatist rebel, Zapatist subcomandante, president-in-exile, sois-disant micronational “emperor,” or just plain old vexillophile, map-freak, news junk, or foreign-policy wonk on your holiday list.


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